all other such external causes that fall in to block the path of men of affairs, he uttered paradoxes wholly at variance with facts about which the past teaches us clearly by countless examples. For instance, shall we call Cato a fortunate and happy man? Or shall we say that Dio of Sicily had a happy lot? It is true that for death they probably cared nothing, but they did care greatly about not leaving unfinished the undertakings which they had originally set on foot, and to secure that end there is nothing that they would not have endured. In that they were disappointed, and I admit that they bore their lot with great dignity, as we learn, and derived no small consolation from their virtue; but happy one could not call them, seeing that they had failed in all those noble enterprises, unless perhaps according to the Stoic conception of happiness. And with regard to that same Stoic conception we must admit that to be applauded and to be counted happy are two very different things, and that if every living thing naturally desires happiness,(385) it is better to make it our aim to be congratulated on the score of happiness rather than to be applauded on the score of virtue. But happiness that depends on the chances of Fortune is very rarely secure. And yet men who are engaged in public life cannot, as the saying is, so much as breathe unless she is on their side ... and they have created a merely verbal idea of a leader who is established somewhere above all the chances of Fortune in the sphere of things incorporeal and intelligible, just as men define the ideas, whether envisaging them truly or falsely imagining them. Or again they give us the ideal man, according to Diogenes) Ἄπολιν, [D] ἄοικον, πατρίδος ἐστερημένον, (“The man without a city, without a home, bereft of a fatherland,”(386)) οὐκ ἔχοντα μὲν εἰς ὅ,τι παρ᾽ αὐτῆς εὖ πάθῃ καὶ τοὐναντίον ἐν τίνι σφαλῇ· τοῦτον δὲ ὃν ἡ συνήθεια καλεῖν εἴωθε καὶ Ὅμηρος πρῶτος, (that is to say, a man who can gain nothing from Fortune, and on the other hand has nothing to lose. But one whom we are in the habit of calling, as Homer did first,) Ὧι λαοί τ᾽ ἐπιτετράφαται καὶ τόσσα μέμηλεν, (“The man to whom the people have been entrusted and so many cares belong,”(387)) πῶς ἄν τις ἔξω τύχης ἀπαγαγὼν τὴν θέσιν φύλάσσοι; πάλιν [257] δ᾽ ὁ αὑτὸν ὑποτιθεὶς ταύτῃ πόσης αὑτῷ δεῖν οἰήσεται παρασκευῆς(388) καὶ φρονήσεως πηλίκης ὥστε τὰς ἐφ᾽ ἑκάτερα ῥοπάς, καθάπερ πνεύματος κυβερνήτην, εὐσχημόνως φέρειν; (how I ask shall we lead him beyond the reach of Fortune and keep his position secure? Then again, if he subject himself to Fortune, how great the provision he will think he must make, how great the prudence he must display so as to sustain with equanimity her variations in either direction, as a pilot must sustain the variations of the wind!)