πιστεύειν. καὶ τοὺς ἐν πολιτείᾳ ζῶντας οὐκ ἔνεστιν ἔνευ ταύτης ἀναπνεῖν τὸ δὴ λεγόμενον ...(377) ἀληθῶς θεωροῦντες εἴτε καὶ πεποιήκασι καὶ στρατηγὸν λόγῳ(378), καθάπερ οἱ τὰς ἰδέας εἴτε καὶ ψευδῶς ξυντιθέντες, ἐν τοῖς ἀσωμάτοις καὶ νοητοῖς ἱδρῦσθαί που τῶν τυχαίων ὑπεράνω πάντων, ἢ τὸν Διογένους ἐκεῖνον (But your method is more likely to discourage than to make one eager for such an existence. Suppose that a man were navigating your strait,(379) and were finding even that none too easy or safe, and then suppose some professional soothsayer should tell him that he would have to traverse the Aegaean and then the Ionian Sea, and finally embark on the outer sea. “Here,” that prophet would say, “you see towns and harbours, but when you arrive there you will see not so much as a watch‐tower or a rock, but you will be thankful to descry even a ship in the distance and to hail her crew. You will often pray to God that you may, however late, touch land and reach a harbour, though that were to be the last day of your life. You will pray to be allowed to bring home your ship safe and sound and restore your crew unscathed to their friends, and then to commit your body to mother earth. And this indeed may happen, but you will not be sure of it until that final day.” Do you think that such a man after being told all this would choose even to live in a sea‐port town? Would he not bid adieu to money‐making and all the advantages of commerce, and caring little for troops of friends and acquaintances abroad, and all that he might learn about nations and cities, would he not approve the wisdom of the son of Neocles(380) who bids us “Live in obscurity”? Indeed, you apparently perceived this, and by your abuse of Epicurus you tried to forestall me and to eradicate beforehand any such purpose. For you go on to say that it was to be expected that so idle a man as he should commend leisure and conversations during walks. Now for my part I have long been firmly convinced that Epicurus was mistaken in that view of his, but whether it be proper to urge into public life any and every man, both him who lacks natural abilities and him who is not yet completely equipped, is a point that deserves the most careful consideration. We are told that Socrates dissuaded from the statesman’s profession(381) many who had no great natural talent, and Glaucon too, Xenophon(382) tells us; and that he tried to restrain the son of Cleinias(383) also, but could not curb the youth’s impetuous ambition. Then shall we try to force into that career men who are reluctant and conscious of their deficiencies, and urge them to be self‐confident about such great tasks? For in such matters not virtue alone or a wise policy is paramount, but to a far greater degree Fortune holds sway throughout and compels events to incline as she wills. Chrysippus(384) indeed, though in other respects he seems a wise man and to have been rightly so esteemed, yet in ignoring fortune and chance and