κἂν ὦσιν ἀγαθοί, συμπέπλεκται θυμῷ καὶ ἐπιθυμίᾳ, θηρίοις χαλεπωτάτοις. ταῦτα ἐμοὶ [262] δοκεῖ τοῖς τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἄκρως ὁμολογεῖν, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι κρείττονα χρὴ τῶν ἀρχομένων εἶναι τὸν ἄρχοντα, οὐκ ἐπιτηδεύσει μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ φύσει διαφέροντα· ὅπερ εὑρεῖν ἐν ἀνθρώποις οὐ ῥᾴδιον·(402) ... καὶ τρίτον ὅτι πάσῃ μηχανῇ κατὰ δύναμιν νόμοις προσεκτέον οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ παραχρῆμα κειμένοις οὐδὲ ὡς ἔοικε νῦν τεθεῖσιν ὑπ᾽ ἀνδρῶν οὐ πάντη κατὰ νοῦν βεβιωκότων, ἀλλ᾽ ὅστις μᾶλλον τὸν νοῦν καθαρθεὶς καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν οὐκ εἰς τὰ παρόντα [B] ἀφορῶν ἀδικήματα οὐδὲ εἰς τὰς παρεστώσας τύχας τίθησι τοὺς νόμους, ἀλλὰ τὴν τῆς πολιτείας φύσιν καταμαθὼν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον οἷόν(403) ἐστι τῇ φύσει καὶ ποταπόν ἐστι τἀδίκημα τεθεαμένος τῇ φύσει, εἶθ᾽ ὅσα δυνατὸν ἐστιν ἐκεῖθεν ἐνταῦθα μεταφέρων καὶ τιθεὶς νόμους τοῖς πολίταις κοινούς, οὔτε εἰς φιλίαν οὔτε εἰς ἔχθραν ἀφορῶν [C] οὔτε εἰς γείτονα καὶ ξυγγενῆ· κρεῖσσον δέ, εἰ μηδὲ τοῖς καθ᾽ ἑαυτὸν ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ὕστερον ἢ ξένοις γράψας ἀποπέμποι νόμους, ἔχων γε οὐδὲν οὐδὲ ἐλπίζων πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἕξειν ἰδιωτικὸν συνάλλαγμα. ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸν Σόλωνα τὸν σοφὸν ἀκούω μετὰ τῶν φίλων συμβουλευσάμενον ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν χρεῶν ἀναιρέσεως τοῖς μὲν εὐπορίας ἀφορμήν, αὑτῷ δὲ αἰσχύνης αἰτίαν παρασχεῖν, καὶ ταῦτα τῷ πολιτεύματι τὸν δῆμον ἐλευθερώσαντα. οὕτως [D] οὐ ῥᾴδιόν ἐστι τὰς τοιαύτας ἐκφυγεῖν κῆρας, κἂν τὸν αὑτοῦ νοῦν παράσχῃ τις ἀπαθῆ πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν. (To me, at any rate, it seems that the task of reigning is beyond human powers, and that a king needs a more divine character, as indeed Plato too used to say. And now I will write out a passage from Aristotle to the same effect, not “bringing owls to the Athenians,”(404) but in order to show you that I do not entirely neglect his writings. In his political treatises he says: “Now even if one maintain the principle that it is best for cities to be governed by a king, how will it be about his children? Ought his children to succeed him? And yet if they prove to be no better than anybody else, that would be a bad thing for the city. But you may say, though he has the power he will not leave the succession to his children? It is difficult indeed to believe that he will not; for that would be too hard for him, and demands a virtue greater than belongs to human nature.”(405) And later on, when he is describing a so‐called king who rules according to law, and says that he is both the servant and guardian of the laws, he does not call him a king at all, nor does he consider such a king as a distinct form of government; and he goes on to say: “Now as for what is called absolute monarchy, that is to say, when a king governs all other men according to his own will, some people think that it is not in accordance with the nature of things for one man to have absolute authority over all the citizens; since those who are by nature equal must necessarily have the same rights.”(406) Again, a little later he says: “It seems, therefore, that he who bids Reason rule is really