for you and your counsels and loving kindness,(310) they may persuade me to be calm and to bear nobly whatever God has sent?(311) For in accordance with the will of God our mighty Emperor has surely planned this as all else. Then what now must be my thoughts, what spells must I find to persuade my soul to bear tranquilly the trouble with which it is now dismayed? Shall I imitate the discourses of Zamolxis(312)—I mean those Thracian spells which Socrates brought to Athens and declared that he must utter them over the fair Charmides before he could cure him of his headache?(313) Or must we leave these alone as being, like large machinery in a small theatre, too lofty for our purpose and suited to greater troubles; and rather from the deeds of old whose fame we have heard told, as the poet says,(314) shall we gather the fairest flowers as though from a variegated and many‐coloured meadow, and thus console ourselves with such narratives and add thereto some of the teachings of philosophy? For just as, for instance, certain drugs are infused into things that have too sweet a taste, and thus their cloying sweetness is tempered, so when tales like these are seasoned by the maxims of philosophy, we avoid seeming to drag in a tedious profusion of ancient history and a superfluous and uncalled‐for flow of words.) Τί πρῶτον; τί δ᾽ ἔπειτα; τί δ᾽ ὑστάτιον καταλέξω; (“What first, what next, what last shall I relate?”(315)) πότερον ὡς ὁ Σκηπίων ἐκεῖνος, ὁ τὸν Λαίλιον ἀγαπήσας καὶ φιληθεὶς τὸ λεγόμενον ἴσῳ ζυγῷ παρ᾽ ἐκείνου πάλιν, ἡδέως μὲν αὐτῷ συνῆν, ἔπραττε δὲ οὐδέν, ὧν μὴ πρότερον ἐκεῖνος πύθοιτο καὶ φήσειεν εἶναι πρακτέον; ὅθεν οἶμαι καὶ λόγον παρέσχε [D] τοῖς ὑπὸ φθόνου τὸν Σκηπίωνα λοιδοροῦσιν, ὡς ποιητὴς μὲν ὁ Λαίλιος εἴη τῶν ἔργων, Ἁφρικανὸς δὲ ὁ τούτων ὑποκριτής. αὕτη τοι καὶ ἡμῖν ἡ φήμη πρόσκειται, καὶ οὐ μόνον οὐ δυχεραίνω(316) χαίρω δὲ ἐπ᾽ αὐτῇ πλέον. τὸ γὰρ τοῖς ὀρθῶς ὑπ᾽ ἄλλου γνωσθεῖσι πεισθῆναι μείζονος ἀρετῆς(317) ὁ Ζήνων ποιεῖται γνώρισμα [245] τοῦ γνῶναί τινα αὐτὸν ἐξ αὑτοῦ τὰ δέοντα, τὴν Ἡσιόδου μεθαρμόττων ῥῆσιν, (Shall I tell how the famous Scipio, who loved Laelius and was loved by him in return with equal yoke of friendship,(318) as the saying is, not only took pleasure in his society, but undertook no task without first consulting with him and obtaining his advice as to how he should proceed? It was this, I understand, that furnished those who from envy slandered Scipio with the saying that Laelius was the real author of his enterprises, and Africanus merely the actor. The same remark is made about ourselves, and, far from resenting this, I rather rejoice at it. For to accept another’s good advice Zeno held to be a sign of greater virtue than independently to decide oneself what one ought to do; and so he altered the saying of Hesiod; for Zeno says:) Οὗτος μὲν πανάριστος, ὃς εὖ εἰπόντι πίθηται (“That man is best who follows good advice” instead of “decides all things for himself.”(319))