5. And it is, secondly, _just_. It renders to all their due. It prescribes exactly what is right, precisely what ought to be done, said or thought both with regard to the author of our being, with regard to ourselves, and with regard to every creature which he has made. It is adapted in all respects to the nature of things, of the whole universe and every individual. It is suited to all the circumstances of each, and to all their mutual relations, whether such as have existed from the beginning, or such as commenced in any following period. It is exactly agreeable to the fitnesses of things, whether essential or accidental. It clashes with none of these in any degree; nor is ever unconnected with them. If the word be taken in that sense, there is nothing _arbitrary_ in the law of God. Altho’ still the whole and every part thereof, is totally dependent upon his will: so that _thy will be done_, is the supreme, universal law both in earth and heaven. 6. “But is the will of God the cause of his law? Is his will the original of right and wrong? Is a thing therefore right, because God wills it? Or does he will it, because it is right?” I fear, this celebrated question is more curious than useful. And perhaps, in the manner it is usually treated of, it does not so well consist with the regard that is due from a creature, to the Creator and governor of all things. ’Tis hardly decent for man, to call the supreme God, to give an account to him! Nevertheless, with awe and reverence we may speak a little. The Lord pardon us, if we speak amiss! 7. It seems then, that the whole difficulty arises, from considering God’s will as distinct from God. Otherwise it vanishes away. For none can doubt, but God is the cause of the law of God. But the will of God is God himself. It is God considered as willing thus or thus. Consequently, to say, That the will of God, or that God himself is the cause of the law, is one and the same thing. 8. *Again; if the law, the immutable rule of right and wrong, depends on the nature and fitnesses of things, and on their essential relations to each other: (I do not say, their eternal relations; because the eternal relation of things existing in time, is little less than a contradiction:) if, I say, this depends on the nature and relations of things, then it must depend on God, or the will of God: because those things themselves, with all their relations, are the works of his hands. By his will, _for his pleasure_ alone, _they_ all _are and were created_. 9. And yet it may be granted (which is probably all that a considerate person would contend for) that in every particular case, God wills this or this (suppose that men should honour their parents) because it is right, agreeable to the fitness of things, to the relation wherein they stand.