Here you see the Holy Spirit has but these two possible ways of acting upon men, it must either only propose an argument, just as a man may propose one, or it must act like a _seal upon wax_. I only ask this writer, whether God communicates _life_, and _strength_, and _understanding_, and _liberty of will_ to us, only as men may communicate any thing to one another? or as a seal acts upon wax? If so, it may be granted, that the Holy Ghost cannot act upon us any other way. But it must be affirmed, that we do, by a continual influx from God, enjoy all these powers, and receive the continuance of all these faculties from him, not as men receive things from one another, nor as _wax_ receives the _impression_ of the _seal_, but in a way as much above our conception, as creation is above our power; if we have all our _power_ of acting, by a _continual communication_ from him, and yet as free agents, have all our _light_ from him, and yet are _accountable intelligent_ beings; then it must be great weakness to affirm, that the Holy Ghost cannot act upon us in the same manner: for it would be saying, God cannot act upon us as he does act upon us. The short of the matter is this. Either this _writer_ must affirm, that our _rational nature_, our _understanding faculties_, our _power_ of action, our _liberty_ of will, must _necessarily_ subsist without the _continual action_ of God upon them, or else he must grant, that God can _act_ upon our _understandings_ and _wills_ without making us as _merely passive_ as the wax under the seal. This writer says, _Though the relation we stand in to God, is not artificial, as most are amongst men――yet this does not hinder, but that we may know the end he had in being related to us as Creator and Governor, and what he requires of his creatures and subjects_. But how are we to know this? _This_, says he, _the divine nature_, which _contains in it all perfection and happiness, plainly points out to us_¹. ¹ Page 29. If he had said, since God must act over us as Creator and Governor, according to his own infinite _perfection and happiness_, therefore his conduct over us may be _very mysterious_, he had drawn a _plain_ conclusion. But he proves all to be plain, because God is to govern us according to something that is not plain, according to his own _incomprehensible nature_. His argument therefore proceeds thus. God must govern us according to his own _infinite perfection and happiness_; but we _do not know_ what his infinite perfections and happiness are: Therefore we _plainly know_ how he is to govern us. Now if this writer is capable of taking such an argument as this to be demonstrative, it is no wonder that all his principles of religion are founded upon demonstration. But if he knows no more of what arises from the _relation_ between God and his creatures, than he has here demonstrated, he might be very well content with some farther knowledge from divine revelation.