And the _reason_ or _relations_ of things shew God’s _antecedent_ wisdom, and are effects of it, just as the nature of _causes_ and _effects_ shew his _antecedent_ power, and are the effects of it. And as he is infinitely powerful, but not from the nature of causes and effects; so he is infinitely wise, but not from the _reason_ and _nature_ of things. Again; if God is _infinite_ wisdom, then his wisdom cannot be founded on the relations of things, unless things _finite_, and relations that began to be, can be the foundation of that wisdom which is infinite, and could not begin to be. Therefore to ask, _what_ it is founded upon, when it can have no foundation upon _any thing_, is asking, what an _independent_ being is dependent upon, or _how_ that began, which could have no beginning? And to ask the reason or foundation of _any one_ of the divine attributes, is the same as asking the reason or foundation of them all. And to seek for the reason or foundation of all the divine attributes, is seeking for the cause of God’s existence. And as we do not come to God’s existence, till we come to the _end_ of _causes_, so nothing that is divine, can be attributed to any cause. Nor is it any more a contradiction to say, there is something whose nature is without any cause or foundation of its existence, than to say, something exists without ever _beginning_ to exist. For as nothing can have a beginning, but as it proceeds from some cause; so that which can have no beginning, can have no cause. If therefore the divine wisdom ever _began_ to be _infinite_, and we could know when that beginning was, we should have some pretence to search for that, upon which its infinity was _founded_; but if it never could begin to be, then to seek for its reason, or foundation, is seeking for its beginning. This writer affirms, that God’s wisdom and goodness must be founded on the nature and reason of things, otherwise it could not be proved, that God was not an _arbitrary being_. * Now to seek for reasons to prove that God is not an arbitrary being, that is, a being of the _highest freedom_ and _independency_, that does every thing according to his _own will_ and _pleasure_, is as vain, as to seek for reasons to prove, that _all things_ are not the effect of his _will_. For if every thing besides God, received its existence from him; if every thing that exists, is the effect of his will, and he can do nothing, but because he wills the doing it, must he not be free and arbitrary in as _high a manner_, as he is powerful? This _writer_ says, _It is not in our power to love the deity, whilst we consider him to be an arbitrary being, acting out of humour and caprice._¹ ¹ Page 31.