* It may be asked, Is there then no _reason_ or _nature_ of things? Yes; as certainly as there are things. But the nature and reason of things, considered _independently_ of the divine will, have no more _obligation_ in them, than a _divine worship_ considered independently of, and without any regard to the _existence_ of God. For the _will_ of God is as absolutely necessary to found all _moral obligation_ upon, as the existence of God is necessary to be the foundation of religious worship. And the fitness of moral obligations, without the _will_ of God, is only like the fitness of _religious_ worship without the _existence_ of God. And it is as just to say, that he destroys the _reason_ of religion, who founds it upon the nature and existence of God, as to say, he saps the foundation of moral obligations, who founds them upon the will of God. And as religion cannot be solidly defended, but by shewing its connexion with, and dependence upon God’s existence; so neither can moral obligations be asserted with reason, but by shewing them to be the will of God. It may again be asked, Can God make that fit in itself, which is in _itself absolutely_ unfit to be done? This question consists of improper terms. For God’s will no more makes actions to be fit _in themselves_, than it makes _things_ to exist _in, or of themselves_. No things, nor any actions have any _absolute_ fitness, of and in _themselves_. A _gift_, a _blow_, the making a _wound_, or _shedding_ of _blood_, considered in themselves, have no _absolute_ fitness, but are fit or unfit according to a variety of accidental circumstances. When therefore God by his will makes any thing fit to be done, he does not make the thing fit in _itself_, which is just in the _same state_ considered in _itself_, that it was before, but it becomes fit for the person to do it, because he can only be happy, or do that which is fit for him to do, by doing the will of God. For instance, the _bare eating_ a fruit, considered in _itself_, is neither fit nor unfit. If a fruit is appointed by God for our food, then it is as fit to eat it, as to preserve our lives. If a fruit is poisonous, then it is as unfit to eat it, as to commit self-murder. If eating of a fruit is prohibited by God, then it is as unfit as to eat our own damnation. But in none of these instances is the eating or not eating, considered in _itself fit_ or _unfit_: but has all its fitness, or unfitness, from such circumstances, as are entirely owing to the will of God. Supposing therefore God to require a person to do something, which according to his present circumstances, _without_ that command, he ought not to do, God does not make that which is _absolutely_ unfit in _itself_, fit to be done: but only adds _new circumstances_ to an action, that is neither fit, nor unfit, moral, nor immoral in _itself_, but because of its circumstances.