Here you see _our reason_, that is, our _faculty_ of reasoning, (for reason cannot be called _ours_ in any other respect,) has no other difference from reason as it is in God, but that of degree. But what greater absurdity can a man fall into, than to suppose, that a being whose existence had a beginning but a few years ago, differs only in a degree from that which could not possibly have a beginning; or that a _dependent_ and _independent_ being, should not be different in _kind_, but _only_ in degree? For to say, that the faculties of a dependent and independent being, may be of the same kind, is as flat a contradiction, as to say, the same kind of thing may be dependent, and independent. Reason belongs to God and man, just as _power_, _existence_, _life_, and _happiness_, belong to God and man; and he that can, from happiness being common to God and man, prove our happiness to be of the _same kind_ and nature with God’s, may also prove reason in God and man to be of the same kind. This writer indeed says, _Our happiness is limited, |because| our reason is so; |and that God has| unlimited happiness, |because| he alone has unlimited reason._¹ ¹ Page 24. But if that which is _necessarily limited_, is different from that which is _necessarily unlimited_, then we have proof enough from this very argument, that a reason _necessarily_ limited cannot be of the _same kind_ with that reason, which is _necessarily_ unlimited. Unless it can be said, that limited and unlimited, finite and infinite, beginning and unbeginning, have no contrariety in _kind_, but only differ, as a _short_ line differs from a _long_ one. * The truth of the matter is this; reason is in God and man, as power is in God and man. And as the divine power has some degree of likeness to human power, yet with an _infinite_ difference from it: so that perfection which we call _reason_ in God, has some degree of likeness to reason as it is in man, yet is _infinitely_ and beyond all conception different from it. * And as our enjoyment of power is so limited, so imperfect, so superficial, as to be scarce sufficient to tell us, what power is, much less what omnipotence is; so our share of reason is so small, and we enjoy it in so imperfect a manner, that we can scarce think or talk intelligibly of it, or so much as define our own faculties of reasoning. CHAPTER II. _Shewing from the |relation| between God and man, that human reason cannot be a competent judge of the |fitness| and |reasonableness| of God’s proceedings with mankind, either as to the |time|, or |matter|, or |manner| of an external revelation._