The World as Will and Idea (Vol. 2 of 3)Schopenhauer, Arthur
Philosophy
The World as Will and Idea (Vol. 2 of 3)
Schopenhauer, Arthur
Idea (Philosophy); Knowledge, Theory of; Philosophy; Will
so by the application of _syllogisms_ to the categories, a task performed
by the _reason_ in accordance with its pretended principle of seeking the
unconditioned, the _Ideas_ of the reason arise. Now this takes place in
the following manner: The three categories of relation supply to
syllogistic reasoning the three only possible kinds of major premisses,
and syllogistic reasoning accordingly falls into three kinds, each of
which is to be regarded as an egg out of which the reason hatches an Idea;
out of the categorical syllogism the Idea of the _soul_, out of the
hypothetical the Idea of the _world_, and out of the disjunctive the Idea
of _God_. In the second of these, the Idea of the world, the symmetry of
the table of the categories now repeats itself again, for its four heads
produce four theses, each of which has its antithesis as a symmetrical
pendant.
We pay the tribute of our admiration to the really exceedingly acute
combination which produced this elegant structure, but we shall none the
less proceed to a thorough examination of its foundation and its parts.
But the following remarks must come first.
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It is astonishing how Kant, without further reflection, pursues his way,
following his symmetry, ordering everything in accordance with it, without
ever taking one of the subjects so handled into consideration on its own
account. I will explain myself more fully. After he has considered
intuitive knowledge in a mathematical reference only, he neglects
altogether the rest of knowledge of perception in which the world lies
before us, and confines himself entirely to abstract thinking, although
this receives the whole of its significance and value from the world of
perception alone, which is infinitely more significant, generally present,
and rich in content than the abstract part of our knowledge. Indeed, and
this is an important point, he has nowhere clearly distinguished
perception from abstract knowledge, and just on this account, as we shall
afterwards see, he becomes involved in irresolvable contradictions with
himself. After he has disposed of the whole sensible world with the
meaningless “it is given,” he makes, as we have said, the logical table of
judgments the foundation-stone of his building. But here again he does not
reflect for a moment upon that which really lies before him. These forms
of judgment are indeed _words_ and _combinations of words_; yet it ought
first to have been asked what these directly denote: it would have been
found that they denote _conceptions_. The next question would then have
been as to the nature of _conceptions_. It would have appeared from the
answer what relation these have to the ideas of perception in which the
world exists; for perception and reflection would have been distinguished.
It would now have become necessary to examine, not merely how pure and
merely formal intuition or perception _a priori_, but also how its
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