as “an act through which given ideas first become knowledge of an object.” According to this, the brutes, since they do not judge, must also have no knowledge of objects. In general, according to Kant, there are only conceptions of objects, no perceptions. I, on the contrary, say: Objects exist primarily only for perception, and conceptions are always abstractions from this perception. Therefore abstract thinking must be conducted exactly according to the world present in perception, for it is only their relation to this that gives content to conceptions; and we must assume for the conceptions no other _a priori_ determined form than the faculty of reflection in general, the nature of which is the construction of conceptions, _i.e._, of abstract non-perceptible ideas, which constitutes the sole function of the _reason_, as I have shown in the first book. I therefore require that we should reject eleven of the categories, and only retain that of causality, and yet that we should see clearly that its activity is indeed the condition of empirical perception, which accordingly is not merely sensuous but intellectual, and that the object so perceived, the object of experience, is one with the idea, from which there remains nothing to distinguish except the thing in itself. After repeated study of the “Critique of Pure Reason” at different periods of my life, a conviction has forced itself upon me with regard to the origin of the Transcendental Logic, which I now impart as very helpful to an understanding of it. Kant’s only discovery, which is based upon objective comprehension and the highest human thought, is the _apperçu_ that time and space are known by us _a priori_. Gratified by this happy hit, he wished to pursue the same vein further, and his love of architectonic symmetry afforded him the clue. As he had found that a pure intuition or perception _a priori_ underlay the empirical _perception_ as its condition, he thought that in the same way certain _pure conceptions_ as presuppositions in our faculty of knowledge must lie at the foundation of the empirically obtained _conceptions_, and that real empirical thought must be only possible through a pure thought _a priori_, which, however, would have no objects in itself, but would be obliged to take them from perception. So that as the _Transcendental Æsthetic_ establishes an _a priori_ basis of mathematics, there must, he supposed, also be a similar basis for logic; and thus, then for the sake of symmetry, the former received a pendant in a _Transcendental Logic_. From this point onwards Kant was no more free, no more in the position of purely, investigating and observing what is present in consciousness; but he was guided by an assumption and pursued a purpose—the purpose of finding what he assumed, in order to add to the Transcendental Æsthetic so happily discovered a Transcendental Logic analogous to it, and thus symmetrically corresponding to it, as a second storey.