If the _intellect_ were not of a subordinate nature, as the two preceding chapters show, then everything which takes place without it, _i.e._, without intervention of the idea, such as reproduction, the development and maintenance of the organism, the healing of wounds, the restoration or vicarious supplementing of mutilated parts, the salutary crisis in diseases, the works of the mechanical skill of animals, and the performances of instinct would not be done so infinitely better and more perfectly than what takes place with the assistance of intellect, all conscious and intentional achievements of men, which compared with the former are mere bungling. In general _nature_ signifies that which operates, acts, performs without the assistance of the intellect. Now, that this is really identical with what we find in ourselves as _will_ is the general theme of this second book, and also of the essay, “_Ueber den Willen in der Natur_.” The possibility of this fundamental knowledge depends upon the fact that _in us_ the will is directly lighted by the intellect, which here appears as self‐consciousness; otherwise we could just as little arrive at a fuller knowledge of it _within us_ as without us, and must for ever stop at inscrutable forces of nature. We have to abstract from the assistance of the _intellect_ if we wish to comprehend the nature of the will in itself, and thereby, as far as is possible, penetrate to the inner being of nature. On this account, it may be remarked in passing, my direct antipode among philosophers is Anaxagoras; for he assumed arbitrarily as that which is first and original, from which everything proceeds, a νους, an intelligence, a subject of ideas, and he is regarded as the first who promulgated such a view. According to him the world existed earlier in the mere idea than in itself; while according to me it is the unconscious _will_ which constitutes the reality of things, and its development must have advanced very far before it finally attains, in the animal consciousness, to the idea and intelligence; so that, according to me, thought appears as the very last. However, according to the testimony of Aristotle (_Metaph._, i. 4), Anaxagoras himself did not know how to begin much with his νους, but merely set it up, and then left it standing like a painted saint at the entrance, without making use of it in his development of nature, except in cases of need, when he did not know how else to help himself. All physico‐theology is a carrying out of the error opposed to the truth expressed at the beginning of this chapter—the error that the most perfect form of the origin of things is that which is brought about by means of an _intellect_. Therefore it draws a bolt against all deep exploration of nature.