Second—We must recognize, however, that the questions within the jurisdiction of such a court would certainly not include all the questions that might lead to war, and therefore we should provide some other instrumentality for helping the solution of those questions which are non-justiciable. This might well be a Commission of Conciliation—a commission to investigate the facts, to consider the arguments on both sides, to mediate between the parties, to see if some compromise cannot be effected, and finally to formulate and recommend a settlement. This may involve time, but the delay, instead of being an objection, is really one of the valuable incidents in the performance of such a function by a commission. We have an example of such a Commission of Conciliation in the controversy between the United States and Great Britain over the Seal Fisheries. The case on its merits as a judicial question was decided against the United States, but the world importance of not destroying the Pribiloff Seal herd by pelagic sealing was recognized and a compromise was formulated by the arbitral tribunal, which was ultimately embodied in a treaty between England, Russia, Japan, and the United States. Similar recommendations were made by the court of arbitration which considered the issues arising between the United States and Great Britain in respect to the Newfoundland Fisheries. Third—Periodical conferences should be held between the members of the League for the declaration of principles of international law. This is really a provision for something in the nature of legislative action by the nations concerned in respect to international law. The principles of international law are based upon custom between nations established by actual practice, by their recognition in treaties and by the consensus of great law writers. Undoubtedly the function of an Arbitral Court established as proposed in the first of the above suggestions would lead to a good deal of valuable judge-made international law. But that would not cover the whole field. Something in the nature of legislation on the subject would be a valuable supplement to existing international law. It would be one of the very admirable results of such a League of Peace that the scope of international law could be enlarged in this way. Mr. Justice Holmes, in the case of Missouri vs. Illinois, to which I have already referred, points out that the Supreme Court in passing on questions between the States and in laying down the principles of international law that ought to govern in controversies between them should not and can not make itself a legislature. But in a League of Peace there is no limit to the power of international conferences of the members in such a quasi-legislative course, except the limit of the wise and the practical.