11. That sabotage, i.e. acts of treachery before a declaration of war, are improbable, but that they may occur simultaneously with the first military hostilities, and that in any case they are not included in the present phase of the inquiry which deals essentially with military operations. W. S. C. _April 26, 1913._ B. [Sidenote: Certainly.] 1. It is useless labour to work out in detail a series of _conventional_ operations. It is only necessary to work out real operations, i.e. the sort of operations an enemy might be expected to attempt. The numbers of these are limited: there are only four types. [Sidenote: Except local co-operation (_see_ A. 11).] 2. First, sabotage, by which is meant acts of treachery perpetrated by persons or vessels in disguise before any declaration of war. Instances of these acts are given by Captain Hankey in his paper. They are an important study, but they do not touch the problems we are now examining, and they are therefore excluded for the present. [Sidenote: Yes.] 3. Secondly, a military raid on Blyth for the purpose of destroying Elswick. We have hitherto assumed 10,000 men for Blyth-Newcastle; either more or less may be required. The force must be numerous enough to make its way in the face of sporadic opposition by unmobilised territorials and by the population, from Blyth to Elswick; to seize and destroy effectively the Elswick Works and the ships in the Tyne. It seems improbable that less than 10,000 men would be sufficient. [Sidenote: Yes.] 4. Thirdly, a raid of not less than 20,000 men on Harwich, with the object of stopping the regular army from going to France. * * * * * The Harwich operation is essentially— (_a._) The secret concentration and embarkation of 20,000 men. (_b._) The destruction of the floating and land defences of Harwich by the escorting hostile squadron. (_c._) The disembarkation of 20,000 men with a proportion of artillery before the British Fleet can arrive in sufficient force to give battle. 5. Fourthly, a landing in the Firth of Tay.