This is not worth doing unless the force landed is at least 35,000 men. It is assumed that war has begun before the enemy actually completed their embarkation; that the British Fleet has been forced to concentrate to the southward [Sidenote: It is almost hopeless to forecast what may happen during this critical time. No escorts could then be spared.] in order to fight a general battle with the German Fleet; that in consequence the northern waters of the North Sea are denuded of ships; and that the passage of fifteen or twenty independent transports to a fixed rendezvous, as suggested, will not be obstructed by any naval force which could not be overcome by the German warship escort. [Sidenote: I doubt if much in the way of escort could be spared. The enemy must be prepared to meet our entire superior force in North Sea.] In this case the forts are fully manned and the whole coast is alarmed and vigilant. The enemy’s transports must be escorted and protected by cruisers or old battleships; the opposition of the forts must be beaten down, and any resistance by local territorials on land must be overcome and quelled. The objective of the invaders is Glasgow and the Clyde. The whole six divisions of the expeditionary force have left England for a distant war. [Sidenote: On the whole this seems a very risky undertaking, but by no means impossible, and on the assumption above, quite worth trying.] The question to be resolved is whether these are all the operations which need be considered at the present time. Are they practicable? [Sidenote: First three certainly.] And if so, to what extent? [Sidenote: With limitations.] How could they be achieved? [Sidenote: As described.] What are the circumstances most favourable to their success? [Sidenote: Knowledge that we intend to send army to France, the strongest inducement, amounting almost to military necessity.] What are the measures which should be taken in each case? [Sidenote: _Navy_— Provide sea defences for Blyth. Strengthen existing ones (notably Harwich) on East Coast. Man them on the principle of a ship in commission with nucleus crew. Provide _local_ submarine defence flotillas at the principal East Coast ports. _Army_— Adhere rigidly to the Committee of Imperial Defence recommendations (1908), as accepted by His Majesty’s Government, [i.e. retain two divisions at home.]] The times and conditions which I have prescribed are illustrative of the problem; and before any attempt is made to work out these cases in detail the conditions should be formulated exactly. W. S. C. _April 24, 1913._