The British Commander-in-Chief had left the Malta Channel in his flagship the _Inflexible_ after midnight of August 4, and at about 11 a.m. on August 5 he had assembled all his three battle cruisers and two light cruisers off Pantellaria island, midway between Sicily and the African coast.[36] According to his own published account[37] he had learned on the 4th that the German mail steamer _General_ was remaining at Messina at the disposition of the _Goeben_. He therefore believed throughout the whole of the 5th that ‘the _Goeben_, _Breslau_ and _General_ were all at Messina.’ His belief was correct. One of his battle cruisers, the _Indomitable_, had to coal. He sent her to Biserta. This was an important decision. Considering that he believed that the _Goeben_ was at Messina, and that he intended himself to watch to the Northward with two battle cruisers, some authorities have held that it would have been a sensible precaution to let this third ship coal at Malta, where facilities were certain and instant, and whence she could so easily move to close the Southern exit from Messina, or join Rear-Admiral Troubridge in the mouth of the Adriatic, as that officer had been led to expect.[38] By sending the _Indomitable_ to coal at Malta, he could have placed two battle cruisers watching the Northern exit and one at the Southern. But the Commander-in-Chief decided to keep all three battle cruisers together in his own hand and to patrol off the Western end of Sicily between Sardinia and Biserta. The Southern exit was therefore left completely open to the _Goeben_: and a severe action was reserved for Rear-Admiral Troubridge if, as seemed likely, she ran up the Adriatic.