On the assumption—which was dominant—that the _Goeben_ would make for Pola, Admiral Troubridge was well placed for meeting her. It was not until he heard from the _Gloucester_ that she had turned South and was persistently steering on a South-Easterly course that any new decision was required from him. He received no orders to quit his station from Sir Berkeley Milne. He was in constant hope of receiving a battle cruiser. But Admiral Troubridge decided to act on his own responsibility. Eight minutes after midnight of August 6 (i.e. 0.08, August 7) he gave orders to his four cruisers and his eight destroyers to steam Southward at full speed for the purpose of intercepting the _Goeben_. He also signalled to the _Dublin_ (Captain John Kelly) at that moment coming from Malta to join him with the two extra destroyers, to head her off. He reported his decision to the Commander-in-Chief. Thus at midnight August 6–7 sixteen British vessels were converging upon the _Goeben_ and _Breslau_ and were in positions from which they could hardly fail to intercept the enemy shortly after daylight. At 3.50 a.m., however, after further reflection and having received no orders or reply from Sir Berkeley Milne, Admiral Troubridge became convinced that he could not hope to engage the _Goeben_ under the advantageous conditions of the half light of dawn, and that in an action fought in broad waters in full daylight, his four ships would be sunk one after another by the _Goeben_, who all the time would keep outside the range—16,000 yards—of the British 9.2–inch guns. This is thought by some naval officers to be an extreme view. The limited ammunition of the _Goeben_ would have had to have been wonderfully employed to have sunk all four British armoured cruisers _seriatim_ at this long range.[39] Moreover, if the _Goeben_ and _Breslau_ had become involved in an action, it is hard to believe that none of the sixteen British cruisers and destroyers which were available could have closed in upon them and attacked them with gun or torpedo. All the destroyers were capable of reaching the enemy and could have found their opportunity to attack. It would have been indeed a prodigious feat on the part of the Germans to dispose of so many antagonists at once. However, the Admiral came to the conclusion that the _Goeben_ was ‘a superior force’ which by his instructions, passed to him by the Commander-in-Chief, he was not to engage. And in this conclusion he has been sustained by a British naval court-martial. He thereupon desisted from his attempt to intercept the _Goeben_, turned his ships and destroyers and entered the harbour of Zante about 10 a.m. preparatory to resuming his watch in the Adriatic. The _Dublin_ and her two destroyers having asked and been refused permission to make a daylight attack, had attempted to intercept the _Goeben_ before dawn, but did not succeed in finding her in the darkness.