8. Such a policy demands heavy and hard sacrifices from France, who must, with great constancy, expose herself to invasion, to having her provinces occupied by the enemy, and to the investment of Paris, and whose armies may be committed to retrograde or defensive operations. Whether her rulers could contemplate or her soldiers endure this trial may depend upon the military support which Great Britain can give; and this must be known beforehand, so that the French war-plans can be adjusted accordingly, and so that we may know, before we decide, what they would be prepared to do. 9. The following measures would appear to be required to enable Great Britain to take an effective part in the decisive theatre of the war:— Men (Approximate). The four divisions of the expeditionary army, with their auxiliary troops, should be sent on the outbreak of war to France 107,000 To these should be added the two remaining divisions as soon as the naval blockade is effectively established 53,000 And the 7th Division from South Africa and the Mediterranean (as soon as the colonial forces in South Africa can be embodied) 15,000 And 5,000 additional Yeomanry cavalry or light horse, with 10,000 volunteer cyclist Territorials 15,000 As we should be allies of Russia, the Anglo-Indian Army could be drawn upon so long as two native regiments were moved out of India for every British regiment. Lord Kitchener has stated that it would be possible in so grave a need, to withdraw six out of the nine field divisions from India, and this should be done immediately. This force could be brought into France by Marseilles by the fortieth day 100,000 ——————— Thus making a total force of 290,000 ——————— This fine army, almost entirely composed of professional soldiers, could be assembled around (say) Tours by the fortieth day, in rear of the French left (instead of being frittered into action piecemeal), and would then become a very important factor in events. The Russian army would also by then be engaged in full force on the eastern frontiers of Germany and Austria, and the power of the three allies should then be sufficient either to hold the Germans in a position of growing difficulty or, if desirable, to assume the offensive in concert.