The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Vol. 7 (of 9): Being His Autobiography, Correspondence, Reports, Messages, Addresses, and Other Writings, Official and PrivateJefferson, Thomas
Philosophy
The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Vol. 7 (of 9): Being His Autobiography, Correspondence, Reports, Messages, Addresses, and Other Writings, Official and Private
Jefferson, Thomas
United States -- Politics and government -- 1775-1783; United States -- Politics and government -- 1783-1865
But experience and reflection have but more and more confirmed me
in the particular importance of the equal representation then proposed.
On that point, then, I am entirely in sentiment with your letters; and
only lament that a copy-right of your pamphlet prevents their appearance
in the newspapers, where alone they would be generally read, and produce
general effect. The present vacancy too, of other matter, would give
them place in every paper, and bring the question home to every man's
conscience.
But inequality of representation in both Houses of our legislature, is
not the only republican heresy in this first essay of our revolutionary
patriots at forming a constitution. For let it be agreed that a government
is republican in proportion as every member composing it has his equal
voice in the direction of its concerns, (not indeed in person, which
would be impracticable beyond the limits of a city, or small township,
but) by representatives chosen by himself, and responsible to him at
short periods, and let us bring to the test of this canon every branch
of our constitution.
In the legislature, the House of Representatives is chosen by less than
half the people, and not at all in proportion to those who do choose.
The Senate are still more disproportionate, and for long terms of
irresponsibility. In the Executive, the Governor is entirely independent
of the choice of the people, and of their control; his Council equally
so, and at best but a fifth wheel to a wagon. In the Judiciary, the
judges of the highest courts are dependent on none but themselves.
In England, where judges were named and removable at the will of an
hereditary executive, from which branch most misrule was feared, and has
flowed, it was a great point gained, by fixing them for life, to make
them independent of that executive. But in a government founded on the
public will, this principle operates in an opposite direction, and against
that will. There, too, they were still removable on a concurrence of the
executive and legislative branches. But we have made them independent of
the nation itself. They are irremovable, but by their own body, for any
depravities of conduct, and even by their own body for the imbecilities
of dotage. The justices of the inferior courts are self-chosen, are for
life, and perpetuate their own body in succession forever, so that a
faction once possessing themselves of the bench of a county, can never
be broken up, but hold their county in chains, forever indissoluble. Yet
these justices are the real executive as well as judiciary, in all our
minor and most ordinary concerns. They tax us at will; fill the office of
sheriff, the most important of all the executive officers of the county;
name nearly all our military leaders, which leaders, once named, are
removable but by themselves. The juries, our judges of all fact, and of
law when they choose it, are not selected by the people, nor amenable to
them.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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