The Year after the Armada, and Other Historical Studies — John Shaqi
The Year after the Armada, and Other Historical StudiesHume, Martin A. S. (Martin Andrew Sharp)
Philosophy
The Year after the Armada, and Other Historical Studies
Hume, Martin A. S. (Martin Andrew Sharp)
Armada, 1588; Europe -- History -- 1517-1648; Europe -- History -- 17th century
But Antonio put a brave face on matters, and was all eagerness to push
on to his faithful capital of Lisbon, which he was confident awaited
him with open arms. His confidence to a certain extent seems to have
been shared by Norris, and here the second great mistake of the
expedition was made. The first vital error was the fruitless waste of
time at Corunna; the second was the resolution now arrived at by
Norris, entirely against Drake's judgment, to march from Peniche
overland forty-two miles to Lisbon. Drake, true to the sea and to the
tactics by which he had so often beaten the Spaniards, was in favour of
pushing on to Lisbon by sea, letting three or four fireships drift
about the castle of São Gian, which commanded the entrance to the
harbour, so that the smoke should spoil the aim of the guns, and then
make a dash for the city--and doubtless, thought Drake, for the
galleon, with its million gold crowns, lying in front of the India
house. Dom Antonio, whose one idea was to keep foot on the land where
he was king, sided with Norris. In vain Drake pointed out that they
had no baggage train or proper provisions for a march through an
enemy's country; that they had only one weak squadron {46} of cavalry,
of which the cattle was out of condition; that they had no fitting
field artillery; and that once inland they would lose the support and
protection of the fleet.
It was all of no avail; Dom Antonio and Norris had their way, and a
single company was left to garrison Peniche,[25] supported by six
ships, whilst the whole of the land forces were to march to Lisbon, and
Drake undertook to bring the rest of the fleet to Cascaes, at the mouth
of the river, when the weather would allow him to do so.
During the night after the landing, some cavalry under Captain Alarcon
had joined the Spaniards, and a force of Portuguese militia had also
been sent in by Don Luis Alencastro, but they soon deserted their
colours and left their officers to shift for themselves. The next
morning at four o'clock Captain Alarcon and a few of the Spanish
cavalry reconnoitred the position at Peniche, but found the enemy too
many for them, and could only scour back as hard as they could ride to
Luis Alencastro, the Grand-Commander of {47} the Order of Christ, who
was endeavouring to reorganise a body of Portuguese a few miles off, on
the road to Lisbon. But terrible tales of the strength of the English
had already spread; and when Alarcon and Guzman reached the
Grand-Commander they found his hasty levies in a panic at the story
that Drake had brought with him nine hundred great Irish dogs as fierce
as lions, and "capable of eating up a world of folks." So they flatly
refused to stir; and the Grand-Commander could do no more than hasten
back to Lisbon to inform the Cardinal-Archduke Albert of the state of
affairs, whilst Guzman, with the troops, fell back upon Torres-Vedras,
to hold if possible the road to Lisbon.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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