2. Though you are unlike others, in the greater enlightenment of your understanding; yet my lecture will equally edify your knowledge, as that of the less enlightened men than yourself. 3. He who is so senseless as to take his body for the soul, is soon found to be upset by his unruly senses; as a charioteer is thrown down by his head-strong and restive horses. (So says the Sruti also. "The soul is the charioteer of the vehicle of the body, and the senses are as its horses"). 4. But the Sapient man who knows the bodiless soul and relies therein, has all his senses under the subjection of his soul; and they do not overthrow him, as obstinate horses do their riders. 5. He who praises no object of enjoyment, but rather finds fault with all of them, and discerns well their evils; enjoys the health of his body without any complaint. (The voluptuary is subject to diseases, but the abstinent is free from them; for in the midst of pleasure there is pain). 6. The soul has no relation with the body, nor is the body related with the soul; they are as unrelated to each other as the light and shade. (And are opposed to one another as sun-light and darkness). 7. The discrete soul is distinct from concrete matter, and free from material properties and accidents; the soul is ever shining and does not rise or set as the material sun and moon (and it never changes as the everchanging objects of changeful nature and mind). 8. The body is a dull mass of vile matter, it is ignorant of itself and its own welfare; it is quite ungrateful to the soul, that makes it sensible; therefore it well deserves its fate of diseases and final dissolution. (The body is frail, and is at best but a fading flower). 9. How can the body be deemed an intelligent thing, when the knowledge of the one (_i.e._, the soul) as intelligence, proves the other (_i.e._, the body) to be but a dull mass. They cannot both be intelligent, when the nature of the one is opposite to that of the other; and if there is no difference between them, they would become one and the same thing (_i.e._ the soul equal with the body, which is impossible). 10. But how is it then, that they mutually reciprocate their feelings of pain and pleasure to one another, unless they are the one and the same thing, and participating of the same properties? (This is a presumptive objection of the antagonistic doctrine, touching the co-relation of the mind and body). 11. It is impossible, Ráma, for the reciprocation of their feelings, that never agree in their natures; the gross body has no connection with the subtile soul, nor has the rarefied soul any relation with the solid body. (It is the gross mind that sympathises with the body, and not the unconnected spirit or soul). 12. The presence of the one, nullifies the existence of the opposite other; as in the cases of day and night, of darkness and light, and of knowledge and ignorance (which are destructive of their opposites).