The Yoga-Vasishtha Maharamayana of Valmiki, Vol. 4 (of 4), Part 2 (of 2)Valmiki
Religion
The Yoga-Vasishtha Maharamayana of Valmiki, Vol. 4 (of 4), Part 2 (of 2)
Valmiki
Hinduism -- Doctrines -- Early works to 1800; Religious life -- Hinduism -- Early works to 1800
18. He then journeyed to the Nandana garden of the gods, which abounded
in kalpa trees rising as high as the waves of the milky ocean; and he
remained in the company of the woodland gods for a septenary, sporting
with the Apsara damsels in their amorous dalliance.
CHAPTER CXXIV.
QUADRIPARTITE STATE OF THE KING VIPASCHIT.
Argument.--The actions of the Individual prince, appertaining to
his quaternary forms.
Ráma said:--Tell me sir, whether the different states and acts of the
prince, relate particularly to any one part of his quadripartite body,
or generally or severally to all and each part of himself; because it
is equally impossible that all and every part should act the same part,
as that the several parts of the same person, could act differently
from the other. (It is unnecessary to be multipartite to act alike, as
well as impossible for the same personality to act differently in its
many persons or parts or forms, which are all one and the same being).
2. Vasishtha replied:--Any person that is conscious of his self
identity, and its invariability and indivisibility, may yet think
himself as another person and doing different things, as a man does in
his dream.
3. Again it is the clearness of the soul, that shows the abstract
images of things in itself, as it did in that of Vipaschit or the wise
prince; and as a mirror reflects the discrete figures of objects, and
of the sky and sea, in its clear and empty bosom.
4. As reflectors made of the same metal, reflect one another in
themselves; so all things which are in reality but of an intellectual
or ideal nature, reflect themselves in the intellect. (The mind is the
repository of the ideal forms of things, and it is mental fallacy only
which makes them appear as real ones. This is the idealistic theory of
Berkeley).
5. Hence whatever object presents itself, to any one of the senses
of any body, is no other than the concretion or density of his
intellectual idea of the same in its nature. (Hence the sensibles are
but solidified ideas, and ectypes of the ideal; and not as causes or
prototypes of our eternal ideas).
6. It is the one and self same thing <that> appears as many, and the
varied ones are but the invariable one in reality; there is no positive
variety nor uniformity either in _esse_, because all apparent variety
is positive unity (_i.e._ all is one, and the one in all).
7. Hence whatever part of the prince, was conscious of anything,
which presented itself before him of any time; the same is said to be
the state of his being during that time. (_i.e._ Whatever a man is
conscious of doing or suffering at any time, the same forms the state
or mode of living for the time being).
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