There were many who believed that General Lee displayed great keenness of vision when he decided to enter Maryland with his army. Such an act on his part would enable the distressed farmers of the South to gather their crops and harvests. Especially was this true in the beautiful and fertile Valley of the Shenandoah. In addition to these advantages, the presence of the Confederate army in Maryland would bring many recruits, it was believed, and at the same time would confuse the Northern army by the possibility of the trouble that might be created there. And every day of delay was of especial advantage to the Confederates, who were working zealously to erect and complete the fortifications of their capital. Another thought that is said to have been in the mind of Lee was that the people of the North, if the war should be transferred to their territory, would thus obtain a more intimate knowledge of its horrors, and this personal experience would arouse a desire to bring the contest to a close. Indeed, it is said that General Lee was confident at this time that he could accomplish the end of the struggle, which now had been fiercely fought for nearly a year and a half. General Lee's first plan was to move rapidly into southern Pennsylvania, and by compelling his enemies to follow him, as he was confident they would do, he would draw them so far away from any defenses such as Pope had recently secured in Washington after the second battle of Bull Run, that if he should then plan for a battle it would be impossible for McClellan's troops to escape surrender as well as defeat. So confident were the Southern leaders now that they were filled with the thought that if the desire for peace could be strengthened in the North by a battle fought on Northern soil, and at the same time if the powers of Europe should agree to secure their cotton from the Southland, the results at the same time would put added pressure upon the Government at Washington and terminate the bloody struggle. Keen as was the plan of General Lee, he was aware that his army was in no condition for an enlarged or energetic campaign. No small part of his men, as they marched over the sandy soil, were leaving bloody marks of their bare feet. It had been impossible to provide many of his soldiers with shoes. The provisions, too, were not sufficient, and in the days that had followed the battle many had been suffering from disease. As a consequence it is said, by those who are competent to judge, that not more than fifty-five thousand men were in the army of the brilliant Southern general when he crossed the Potomac River.