Theism and Humanism: Being the Gifford Lectures Delivered at the University of Glasgow, 1914Balfour, Arthur James
Religion
Theism and Humanism: Being the Gifford Lectures Delivered at the University of Glasgow, 1914
Balfour, Arthur James
Humanism; Naturalism; Theism
But we have not to do with intellectual values alone. There are beliefs
(as I have already said) round which crystallise complex emotions,
æsthetic and ethic, which play no small part in our highest life.
Without the beliefs the emotions would dwindle; without the emotions
the beliefs would lose their worth. Though they do not imply each other
in the world of logic, they are mutually necessary in the world of
values. Here, of course, there is no question of a contrast between the
logical and the causal series. Emotions are always effects; they are
never inferences. In their case, therefore, the relation of value to
origin is not obscured by considerations like those which must occupy
us in the case of mere beliefs; and we have to face in a simpler and
more direct form the central problem of these lectures: the problem of
the relation which origin bears to value. It is with this branch of
my subject as it is raised by æsthetic and by ethic emotions that I
shall be mainly occupied in the next two lectures. And as in the later
part of my course I shall contend that it is destructive of rational
values to root them in unreason, so I shall now contend that the
emotional values associated with, and required by, our beliefs about
beauty and virtue must have some more congruous source than the blind
transformation of physical energy. If I am successful in my endeavour
I shall have done something to show that “design” is demanded by all
that we deem most valuable in life, by beauty, by morals, by scientific
truth: and that it is design far deeper in purpose, far richer in
significance, than any which could be inferred from the most ingenious
and elaborate adjustments displayed by organic life.
FOOTNOTES:
[2] As I shall often have to mention “selection” in the course of these
lectures, I must observe that it is no part of my business to weigh the
comparative merits of competing evolutionary theories. It may be that
the hypothesis of small random variations accumulated or eliminated
according as they help or hinder survival, is, in the light of recent
research, insufficient and unsatisfactory. From my point of view this
is immaterial. I use the word “selection” as a convenient name for
any non-rational process, acting through heredity, which successfully
imitates contrivance. Darwin’s theory, be it true or false, still
provides, I suppose, the only suggestion as to how this feat may
be accomplished, and his terminology may be used without danger of
misunderstanding.
PART II
_ÆSTHETIC AND ETHICAL VALUES_
LECTURE III
ÆSTHETIC AND THEISM
I
In this lecture I have undertaken to consider certain beliefs and
emotions relating to beauty, and to inquire how far their value is
affected by our views as to their origin.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account