Theologico-Political Treatise — Part 1Spinoza, Benedictus de
PhilosophyPhilosophy
Theologico-Political Treatise — Part 1
Spinoza, Benedictus de
Free thought -- Early works to 1800; Philosophy and religion -- Early works to 1800; Political science -- Early works to 1800
(3) For example, the law that all bodies impinging on lesser bodies, lose as
much of their own motion as they communicate to the latter is a universal
law of all bodies, and depends on natural necessity. (4) So, too, the law
that a man in remembering one thing, straightway remembers another either
like it, or which he had perceived simultaneously with it, is a law which
necessarily follows from the nature of man. (5) But the law that men must
yield, or be compelled to yield, somewhat of their natural right, and that
they bind themselves to live in a certain way, depends on human decree. (6)
Now, though I freely admit that all things are predetermined by universal
natural laws to exist and operate in a given, fixed, and definite
manner, I still assert that the laws I have just mentioned depend on human
decree.
(1.) (7) Because man, in so far as he is a part of nature, constitutes a
part of the power of nature. (8) Whatever, therefore, follows necessarily
from the necessity of human nature (that is, from nature herself, in so far
as we conceive of her as acting through man) follows, even though it be
necessarily, from human power. (9) Hence the sanction of such laws may very
well be said to depend on man's decree, for it principally depends on the
power of the human mind; so that the human mind in respect to its perception
of things as true and false, can readily be conceived as without such laws,
but not without necessary law as we have just defined it.
(2.) (10) I have stated that these laws depend on human decree because it is
well to define and explain things by their proximate causes. (11) The
general consideration of fate and the concatenation of causes would aid us
very little in forming and arranging our ideas concerning particular
questions. (12) Let us add that as to the actual coordination and
concatenation of things, that is how things are ordained and linked
together, we are obviously ignorant; therefore, it is more profitable for
right living, nay, it is necessary for us to consider things as contingent.
(13) So much about law in the abstract.
(14) Now the word law seems to be only applied to natural phenomena by
analogy, and is commonly taken to signify a command which men can either
obey or neglect, inasmuch as it restrains human nature within certain
originally exceeded limits, and therefore lays down no rule beyond human
strength. (15) Thus it is expedient to define law more particularly as a
plan of life laid down by man for himself or others with a certain object.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account