Theologico-Political Treatise — Part 2Spinoza, Benedictus de
PhilosophyPhilosophy
Theologico-Political Treatise — Part 2
Spinoza, Benedictus de
Free thought -- Early works to 1800; Philosophy and religion -- Early works to 1800; Political science -- Early works to 1800
(23) I. The nature and properties of the language in which the books of the
Bible were written, and in which their authors were, accustomed to speak.
(24) We shall thus be able to investigate every expression by comparison
with common conversational usages.
(25) Now all the writers both of the Old Testament and the New were Hebrews:
therefore, a knowledge of the Hebrew language is before all things
necessary, not only for the comprehension of the Old Testament, which was
written in that tongue, but also of the New: for although the latter was
published in other languages, yet its characteristics are Hebrew.
(26) II. An analysis of each book and arrangement of its contents under
heads; so that we may have at hand the various texts which treat of a given
subject. (27) Lastly, a note of all the passages which are ambiguous or
obscure, or which seem mutually contradictory.
(28) I call passages clear or obscure according as their meaning is inferred
easily or with difficulty in relation to the context, not according as their
truth is perceived easily or the reverse by reason. (29) We are at work not
on the truth of passages, but solely on their meaning. (30) We must take
especial care, when we are in search of the meaning of a text, not to be led
away by our reason in so far as it is founded on principles of natural
knowledge (to say nothing of prejudices): in order not to confound the
meaning of a passage with its truth, we must examine it solely by means of
the signification of the words, or by a reason acknowledging no foundation
but Scripture.
(31) I will illustrate my meaning by an example. (32) The words of Moses,
"God is a fire" and "God is jealous," are perfectly clear so long as we
regard merely the signification of the words, and I therefore reckon them
among the clear passages, though in relation to reason and truth they are
most obscure: still, although the literal meaning is repugnant to the
natural light of reason, nevertheless, if it cannot be clearly overruled on
grounds and principles derived from its Scriptural "history," it, that is,
the literal meaning, must be the one retained: and contrariwise if these
passages literally interpreted are found to clash with principles derived
from Scripture, though such literal interpretation were in absolute harmony
with reason, they must be interpreted in a different manner, i.e.
metaphorically.
(33) If we would know whether Moses believed God to be a fire or not, we
must on no account decide the question on grounds of the reasonableness or
the reverse of such an opinion, but must judge solely by the other opinions
of Moses which are on record.
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