Theologico-Political Treatise — Part 2Spinoza, Benedictus de
PhilosophyPhilosophy
Theologico-Political Treatise — Part 2
Spinoza, Benedictus de
Free thought -- Early works to 1800; Philosophy and religion -- Early works to 1800; Political science -- Early works to 1800
(22) We may, in fact, say that a miracle is an event of which the causes
annot be explained by the natural reason through a reference to ascertained
workings of nature; but since miracles were wrought according to the
understanding of the masses, who are wholly ignorant of the workings of
nature, it is certain that the ancients took for a miracle whatever they
could not explain by the method adopted by the unlearned in such cases,
namely, an appeal to the memory, a recalling of something similar, which is
ordinarily regarded without wonder; for most people think they sufficiently
understand a thing when they have ceased to wonder at it. (23) The ancients,
then, and indeed most men up to the present day, had no other criterion for
a miracle; hence we cannot doubt that many things are narrated in Scripture
as miracles of which the causes could easily be explained by reference to
ascertained workings of nature. (24) We have hinted as much in Chap. II., in
speaking of the sun standing still in the time of Joshua, and to say on the
subject when we come to treat of the interpretation of miracles later on in
this chapter.
(25) It is now time to pass on to the second point, and show that we cannot
gain an understanding of God's essence, existence, or providence by means of
miracles, but that these truths are much better perceived through the fixed
and immutable order of nature. (26) I thus proceed with the demonstration.
(27) As God's existence is not self-evident (6) it must necessarily be
inferred from ideas so firmly and incontrovertibly true, that no power can
be postulated or conceived sufficient to impugn them. (28) They ought
certainly so to appear to us when we infer from them God's existence, if we
wish to place our conclusion beyond the reach of doubt; for if we could
conceive that such ideas could be impugned by any power whatsoever, we
should doubt of their truth, we should doubt of our conclusion, namely, of
God's existence, and should never be able to be certain of anything. (29)
Further, we know that nothing either agrees with or is contrary to nature,
unless it agrees with or is contrary to these primary ideas; wherefore if we
would conceive that anything could be done in nature by any power whatsoever
which would be contrary to the laws of nature, it would also be contrary to
our primary ideas, and we should have either to reject it as absurd, or else
to cast doubt (as just shown) on our primary ideas, and consequently on the
existence of God, and on everything howsoever perceived. (30) Therefore
miracles, in the sense of events contrary to the laws of nature, so far from
demonstrating to us the existence of God, would, on the contrary, lead us to
doubt it, where, otherwise, we might have been absolutely certain of it, as
knowing that nature follows a fixed and immutable order.
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