Theory & History of HistoriographyCroce, Benedetto
Philosophy
Theory & History of Historiography
Croce, Benedetto
Historiography
of like sort: they are all most reverent theologians, but chaotic,
falling back into those fallacious conceptions which had been refuted
by romantic historiography.
Truly, when faced with such histories as these, superficial or
unintelligent or rude and fantastic, romanticism, conscious of the
altitude to which it had elevated the study of the development of human
affairs, might have exclaimed (and indeed it did exclaim by the mouth
of its epigoni) to its adversaries and successors, in imitation of the
tone of Bonaparte on the 18th of Brumaire: "What have you done with the
history which I left to you so brilliant? Were these the new methods,
by means of which you promised to solve the problems which I had not
been able to solve? I see nothing in them but _revers et misère!_" But
we who have never met with absolute regressions during the secular
development of historiography shall not allow ourselves to be carried
away upon the polemical waves now beating against the positivistic and
naturalistic school which is our present or recent adversary, to the
point of losing sight of what it possessed that was substantially its
own, and owing to which it really did represent progress. We shall also
refrain from drawing comparisons between romanticism and positivism,
by measuring the merits of both, and concluding with the assertion
of the superiority of the former; because it is well known that such
examinations of degrees of merit, the field of professors, are not
permissible in history, where what follows ideally after is virtually
superior to that from which it is derived, notwithstanding appearances
to the contrary. And in the first place, it would be erroneous,
strictly speaking, to believe that what had been won by romanticism had
been lost in positivism, because when the histories of this period are
looked upon from other points of view and with greater attention, we
see how they were all preserved. Romanticism had abolished historical
dualism, for which there existed in reality positive and negative,
elect and outcast, facts. Positivism repeated that all facts are
facts and all have an equal right to enter history. Romanticism had
substituted the conception of development for the abysses and the
chasms that previous historiography had introduced into the course
of events, and positivism repeated that conception, calling it
_evolution._ Romanticism had established periods in development, either
in the form of a cycle of phases, like Vico, or as phases without
a circle and in linear order, like the German romantics, and had
exemplified the various phases as a series of the forms of the spirit
or of psychological forms, and positivism renewed these conceptions
(although owing to the lack of culture usual with its adherents it
often believed that it had made discoveries never made before), as can
be proved by a long series of examples. These range from the _three
ages_ of mental development of Comte to the _eight phases_ of social
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