The Czar, on the other hand, had full confidence in the loyalty of the Grand-Duke Nicholas. He considered him incapable of any criminal action, but he was compelled to admit his complicity in the intrigue against the Czarina. Yet he did not give way until the imperious instinct urging him to put himself at the head of his army had become an obligation of conscience. By intervening personally in the struggle he hoped to show the world that the war would be fought out to the bitter end and prove his own unshakable faith in ultimate victory. In this tragic hour he thought it was his duty to stake his own person, and as head of the state to assume the full burden of responsibility. By his presence among the troops he wished to restore their confidence, for their _morale_ had been shaken by the long series of reverses, and they were tired of fighting against an enemy whose strength consisted principally in the superiority of his armament. In spite of the recent retreats, the prestige of the Grand-Duke Nicholas was still considerable in Russia. During this first twelve months of the war he had given proof of resolution and an iron will. The fact that he was deprived of his command in times of defeat indicated that he was held responsible, and was bound to be interpreted as a punishment, as unjust on the merits as insulting to his honour. The Czar fully realised all this, and only decided as he did much against his will. His first idea had been to keep the Grand-Duke with him at G.H.Q., but that would have made the position of the ex-Generalissimo somewhat delicate. The Czar decided to appoint him Lieutenant-General of the Caucasus and Commander-in-Chief of the army operating against the Turks. The Czar communicated his decision to take over the Supreme Command to his Ministers at a council which took place at Tsarskoïe-Selo a few days before his departure for G.H.Q. The news threw most of those present into utter consternation, and they did their best to dissuade him from his project. They pointed to the grave difficulties in the way of public business if the head of the state was to spend practically all his time at G.H.Q., more than five hundred miles from the seat of government. They referred to his innumerable duties and asked him not to take new and crushing responsibilities upon himself. In the last resort they begged him not to place himself at the head of his troops at a moment so critical. In case of failure he was running a risk of exposing himself to attacks which would undermine his prestige and authority. Yet the Czar was not to be moved. Several members of his immediate _entourage_ made several further attempts to convince him, but these failed also, and on the evening of September 4th he left for Mohileff, where G.H.Q. was established at that time. The next day he signed the _Prikase_, in which he announced to the troops that he was taking command in person, and at the foot he added in his own hand: