Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous in Opposition to Sceptics and AtheistsBerkeley, George
Philosophy
Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous in Opposition to Sceptics and Atheists
Berkeley, George
Idealism; Soul
PHIL. Have all other animals as good grounds to think the same of the
figure and extension which they see and feel?
HYL. Without doubt, if they have any thought at all.
PHIL. Answer me, Hylas. Think you the senses were bestowed upon all
animals for their preservation and well-being in life? or were they given
to men alone for this end?
HYL. I make no question but they have the same use in all other
animals.
PHIL. If so, is it not necessary they should be enabled by them to
perceive their own limbs, and those bodies which are capable of harming
them?
HYL. Certainly.
PHIL. A mite therefore must be supposed to see his own foot, and things
equal or even less than it, as bodies of some considerable dimension;
though at the same time they appear to you scarce discernible, or at best
as so many visible points?
HYL. I cannot deny it.
PHIL. And to creatures less than the mite they will seem yet larger?
HYL. They will.
PHIL. Insomuch that what you can hardly discern will to another
extremely minute animal appear as some huge mountain?
HYL. All this I grant.
PHIL. Can one and the same thing be at the same time in itself of
different dimensions?
HYL. That were absurd to imagine.
PHIL. But, from what you have laid down it follows that both the
extension by you perceived, and that perceived by the mite itself, as
likewise all those perceived by lesser animals, are each of them the true
extension of the mite's foot; that is to say, by your own principles you
are led into an absurdity.
HYL. There seems to be some difficulty in the point.
PHIL. Again, have you not acknowledged that no real inherent property
of any object can be changed without some change in the thing itself?
HYL. I have.
PHIL. But, as we approach to or recede from an object, the visible
extension varies, being at one distance ten or a hundred times greater
than another. Doth it not therefore follow from hence likewise that it is
not really inherent in the object?
HYL. I own I am at a loss what to think.
PHIL. Your judgment will soon be determined, if you will venture to
think as freely concerning this quality as you have done concerning the
rest. Was it not admitted as a good argument, that neither heat nor cold
was in the water, because it seemed warm to one hand and cold to the
other?
HYL. It was.
PHIL. Is it not the very same reasoning to conclude, there is no
extension or figure in an object, because to one eye it shall seem
little, smooth, and round, when at the same time it appears to the other,
great, uneven, and regular?
HYL. The very same. But does this latter fact ever happen?
PHIL. You may at any time make the experiment, by looking with one eye
bare, and with the other through a microscope.
HYL. I know not how to maintain it; and yet I am loath to give up
EXTENSION, I see so many odd consequences following upon such a
concession.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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