PHIL. It is therefore somewhat in its own nature entirely distinct from extension? HYL. I tell you, extension is only a mode, and Matter is something that supports modes. And is it not evident the thing supported is different from the thing supporting? PHIL. So that something distinct from, and exclusive of, extension is supposed to be the SUBSTRATUM of extension? HYL. Just so. PHIL. Answer me, Hylas. Can a thing be spread without extension? or is not the idea of extension necessarily included in SPREADING? HYL. It is. PHIL. Whatsoever therefore you suppose spread under anything must have in itself an extension distinct from the extension of that thing under which it is spread? HYL. It must. PHIL. Consequently, every corporeal substance, being the SUBSTRATUM of extension, must have in itself another extension, by which it is qualified to be a SUBSTRATUM: and so on to infinity. And I ask whether this be not absurd in itself, and repugnant to what you granted just now, to wit, that the SUBSTRATUM was something distinct from and exclusive of extension? HYL. Aye but, Philonous, you take me wrong. I do not mean that Matter is SPREAD in a gross literal sense under extension. The word SUBSTRATUM is used only to express in general the same thing with SUBSTANCE. PHIL. Well then, let us examine the relation implied in the term SUBSTANCE. Is it not that it stands under accidents? HYL. The very same. PHIL. But, that one thing may stand under or support another, must it not be extended? HYL. It must. PHIL. Is not therefore this supposition liable to the same absurdity with the former? HYL. You still take things in a strict literal sense. That is not fair, Philonous. PHIL. I am not for imposing any sense on your words: you are at liberty to explain them as you please. Only, I beseech you, make me understand something by them. You tell me Matter supports or stands under accidents. How! is it as your legs support your body? HYL. No; that is the literal sense. PHIL. Pray let me know any sense, literal or not literal, that you understand it in.--How long must I wait for an answer, Hylas? HYL. I declare I know not what to say. I once thought I understood well enough what was meant by Matter's supporting accidents. But now, the more I think on it the less can I comprehend it: in short I find that I know nothing of it. PHIL. It seems then you have no idea at all, neither relative nor positive, of Matter; you know neither what it is in itself, nor what relation it bears to accidents? HYL. I acknowledge it. PHIL. And yet you asserted that you could not conceive how qualities or accidents should really exist, without conceiving at the same time a material support of them? HYL. I did. PHIL. That is to say, when you conceive the real existence of qualities, you do withal conceive Something which you cannot conceive?