Church of England -- Sermons; Conscience; Obedience; Sermons, English -- 18th century; Trinity -- Early works to 1800
Now, because this is a prejudice which may prevail with some persons so
far as to lessen the influence of the Gospel, and whereas, therefore,
this is an opinion which men of education are likely to be encountered
with when they have produced themselves into the world, I shall endeavour
to show that their preference of heathen wisdom and virtue before that of
the Christian is every way unjust, and grounded upon ignorance or
mistake; in order to which I shall consider four things:—
_First_, I shall produce certain points wherein the wisdom and virtue
of all unrevealed philosophy in general fell short and was very
imperfect.
_Secondly_, I shall show, in several instances, where some of the most
renowned philosophers have been grossly defective in their lessons of
morality.
_Thirdly_, I shall prove the perfection of Christian wisdom from the
proper characters and marks of it.
_Lastly_, I shall show that the great examples of wisdom and virtue
among the heathen wise men were produced by personal merit, and not
influenced by the doctrine of any sect; whereas, in Christianity, it is
quite the contrary.
_First_, I shall produce certain points wherein the wisdom and virtue of
all unrevealed philosophy in general fell short and was very imperfect.
My design is to persuade men that Christian philosophy is in all things
preferable to heathen wisdom; from which, or its professors, I shall,
however, have no occasion to detract. They were as wise and as good as
it was possible for them to be under such disadvantages, and would have
probably been infinitely more so with such aids as we enjoy; but our
lessons are certainly much better, however our practices may fall short.
The first point I shall mention is that universal defect which was in all
their schemes, that they could not agree about their chief good, or
wherein to place the happiness of mankind; nor had any of them a
tolerable answer upon this difficulty to satisfy a reasonable person.
For to say, as the most plausible of them did, “That happiness consisted
in virtue,” was but vain babbling, and a mere sound of words to amuse
others and themselves; because they were not agreed what this virtue was
or wherein it did consist; and likewise, because several among the best
of them taught quite different things, placing happiness in health or
good fortune, in riches or in honour, where all were agreed that virtue
was not, as I shall have occasion to show when I speak of their
particular tenets.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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