Number and its units, 75-77, number and accompanying intuition of space, 78-85; Two kinds of multiplicity, of material objects and conscious states, 85-87, impenetrability of matter, 88-89, homogeneous time and pure duration, 90-91; Space and its contents, 92, empirical theories of space, 93-94, intuition of empty homogeneous medium peculiar to man, 95-97, time as homogeneous medium reducible to space, 98-99; Duration, succession and space, 100-104, pure duration, 105-106; Is duration measurable? 107-110; Is motion measurable? 111-112; Paradox of the Eleatics, 113-115; Duration and simultaneity, 115-116; Velocity and simultaneity, 117-119; Space alone homogeneous, duration and succession belong to conscious mind, 120-121; Two kinds of multiplicity, qualitative and quantitative, 121-123, superficial psychic states invested with discontinuity of their external causes, 124-126, these eliminated, real duration is felt as a quality, 127-128; The two aspects of the self, on the surface well-defined conscious states, deeper down states which interpenetrate and form organic whole, 129-139, solidifying influence of language on sensation, 129-132, analysis distorts the feelings, 132-134, deeper conscious states forming a part of ourselves, 134-136; Problems soluble only by recourse to the concrete and living self, 137-139. _pp._ 75-139 CHAPTER III THE ORGANIZATION OF CONSCIOUS STATES FREE WILL Dynamism and mechanism, 140-142; Two kinds of determinism, 142; Physical determinism, 143-155: and molecular theory of matter, 143, and conservation of energy, 144, if conservation universal, physiological and nervous phenomena necessitated, but perhaps not conscious states, 145-148, but is principle of conversation universal? 149, it may not apply to living beings and conscious states, 150-154, idea of its universality depends on confusion between concrete duration and abstract time, 154-155; Psychological determinism, 155-163: implies associationist conception of mind, 155-158, this involves defective conception of self, 159-163; The free act: freedom as expressing the fundamental self, 165-170; Real duration and contingency, 172-182: could our act have been different? 172-175, geometrical representation of process of coming to a decision, 175-178, the fallacies to which it leads determinists and libertarians, 179-183; Real duration and prediction, 183-198: conditions of Paul's prediction of Peter's action (1) being Peter (2) knowing already his final act, 184-189, the three fallacies involved, 190-192, astronomical prediction depends on hypothetical acceleration of movements, 193-195, duration cannot be thus accelerated, 196-198; Real duration and causality, 199-221: the law "same antecedents, same consequents," 199-201, causality as regular succession, 202-203, causality as prefiguring: two kinds (1) prefiguring as mathematical pre-existence; implies non-duration, but we _endure_ and therefore may be free, 204-210, (2) prefiguring as