Towards an enduring peace : $b A symposium of peace proposals and programs 1914-1916
History
Towards an enduring peace : $b A symposium of peace proposals and programs 1914-1916
Peace; World War, 1914-1918 -- Peace
Mr. Dickinson ignores these considerations when he speaks of national
antagonisms arising “because a few men of the military and diplomatic
caste have a theory about States, their interests and destinies.” He
ignores the monopolies, the use of tariffs, the special privileges
of which political power is the instrument. He does not face the
fact that in every country there are exporters of goods and capital,
concession-hunters and traders, who stand to gain by the use of
governmental power in half developed territory. To them at least it is
not a matter of indifference whether Germany is politically supreme in
say India or China. Since Germany has brought the doctrine of protection
to its highest point, it would make a very great difference to the
commerce of other nations if Germany developed a world-empire.
How little reality there is in Mr. Dickinson’s contention may be seen
by analyzing his concrete proposals. Apart from the shattering of the
great illusion of the governmental mind by a propaganda, he suggests a
settlement of Europe on the basis of nationality, capped by a League of
Europe to maintain the peace.
[Sidenote: Governmental theory not mere illusion.]
Now there are all sorts of reasons for trying to found States on
nationality, and the only reason against the proposal is the reason on
which Mr. Dickinson’s article is built. He tells us on one page that
“ordinary people, in the course of their daily lives, do not think at all
in terms of the state.” Then what difference does it make to people of
the same nationality that they should be under different governments, and
how is the world’s peace to be assured by gathering into one State people
who do not care about the State? Either the people have an interest in
the State or they have not, but surely it is futile for Mr. Dickinson to
argue in one place against the German contention that their emigrants are
“lost,” and in another that the Danes of Schleswig-Holstein should go
back to Denmark. And what does he mean by telling us that in the event
of an Austro-German victory “Italy and the Balkans will be pillaged to
the benefit of Austria, and Russia rolled back—though that would be all
to the good—from her ambition to expand in the West.” Is Mr. Dickinson
also afflicted with the “governmental mind,” that he should talk of
“benefit” to Austria and pronounce it good that “Russia” be rolled back?
What does he mean by telling us that “the English and the French must not
take the German colonies, or the Russians the Baltic coast, the Balkans,
or Constantinople,” for what difference does it make, except to the
“governmental mind,” who exercises political power!
[Sidenote: Mr. Dickinson ignores crucial problems.]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account