The later developments of the Obregon idea were marked by an obvious anxiety to reach a permanent solution of the immediate and pressing difficulties of Mexico, and most of all to secure recognition by the United States and financial aid from American bankers, as the _sine qua non_ of such a solution. The efforts put forth were powerful, but the driving force back of them was primarily personal ambition and the realization that only such a solution could save the happy hunting grounds of revolutionary leaders from some sort of foreign intendancy. And above and beyond and behind all, were the factors of government whose origins and whose immediate past seem indeed to be as firmly stamped upon their natures as the spots upon the leopard or his skin upon the Ethiopian. The completed cycle of the bolshevist experiment and the arrival back at the sale of privilege links up with the failure of Obregon to offer anything but, first, a promise of reversion to reactionary czarism and, second, that unconcealed offering of privileges and promises of power to all who could or who might aid in the campaign for recognition and for foreign loans. The condition seems to me to sound a call as of Elijah for a new understanding of the Mexican problem. Carrancism might have been but an isolated interlude, might have been a mere question of observation and interpretation, if the end had not come and if business in Mexico were not continuing to pay for its sorry privileges in the same sorry way. Obregon might perhaps have been the hope for peace and happiness in Mexico if we had not had Carranza and de la Huerta and if their followers, with their cynical mouthings of all the most sacred faiths of man, were not to-day still the rulers of Mexico, still the sellers of privilege in the name of human progress. We must, I believe, cast away the too long nurtured idea that the battle in Mexico is between the progressive thought of the day and the reactionary conservatism of great interests. I have sought here to show why this is so. A revolution which can evolve the idea of the socialization of great industry and can, in the very conception of that idea, turn it to the looting of that industry for private graft and gain, as in Yucatan; a revolution which can produce the uncontrolled radicalism of Carranza and evolve through the cynical play-acting of de la Huerta into the promise of reactionism in Obregon with all the unholy forces which supported Carranza rallying to uphold his successors--such a revolution will not, unredeemed, carry Mexico into her next era of progress and peace. Capital and socialism must alike beware. Neither should, in honesty with itself, accept a cause in Mexico until the issue is joined clear.