It must be borne in mind that in most cases the artillery will play
a large part in the gaining and maintaining of fire superiority.
But this fact does not alter the work of the infantry; we must
still do most of the killing and unnerving of the enemy and this is
true whether the enemy consists of infantry alone or of infantry in
conjunction with artillery.
In this chapter the first part is much like “right line strategy”
mathematics applied to a battlefield where little is subject to such
treatment. But that seemed the easiest and simplest way to make clear
to beginners terms that must be fully understood. It is hoped that
that part of the chapter will be understood as meant, as offering
merely a means of illustration and not as implying that a battle can
be worked out with mathematical precision.
IV
COMBAT
War, according to Clausewitz, is the continuation of diplomacy.
Diplomacy is not always able to settle international disputes, then
the army must do what the diplomats have failed to accomplish. In our
own history it has been the mass of the people who have forced our
wars, and who, in the case of a strong public sentiment arising, will
involve us again. On account of the state of preparedness of most
great nations and because of the enormous cost of modern war, wars
are shorter than formerly.
[Sidenote: Object of an army]
If this country becomes involved in a war with a military power it
will be impracticable to learn the art of war and train an army after
the outbreak; the war will not last long enough. The object of having
an army is for war not for peace, and the battles alone really decide
the issue; the battles are not numerous but each tends one way or the
other to end the struggle. Great armies exist for many years between
wars and are then trained for these few days of battles which
determine the fate of the nation. The whole aim of an army should be
to be ready for war and the success or failure in war is determined
by a few days of battle. Untrained troops are of no value on the
modern battlefield.
[Sidenote: Training for battle]
Part of our close order drill, the ceremonies and some other things
we teach, are accessories and, if given their proper place, are
of value, but the battlefield is the crucial test; by our fitness
for that must our training be judged. The work of generals and the
general staff is vitally important but the best plan will accomplish
nothing if there are no trained companies to carry out their part.
In this chapter is considered the training necessary for combat. This
is the work executed under the severest strain and under the greatest
difficulties of leadership and control. This training must be
thorough and the things in combat which have to be done must become a
habit.
THE COMPANY
[Sidenote: Extended order practice]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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