If disclosures of consequence are made, and the attendant should feel it his duty to look forward to the future judicial proceedings and to the probability of his appearing as a witness, he ought to remember the general rule is, that his account of what the patient told him is not evidence in the eye of the law, unless it was told under the consciousness of the approach of death. Of late, however, the rigour of this principle in law has been occasionally departed from in Scottish practice; and in regard to medical facts ascertained in the way here mentioned, many strong reasons might be assigned for such relaxation. Evidence of the kind is technically called the death-bed declaration of the deceased, and is justly accounted very important. Here it is right to take notice of a part of the death-bed evidence, although it does not properly belong to the question of suicide, because it should always be collected if possible by the medical attendant, and with much greater care than is generally bestowed on it even by him—I mean the history of the symptoms previously to his being called in. On this part of the history, including particularly the time and manner in which the illness began, medical conclusions of extreme consequence are often subsequently founded: On a single fact or two may depend the fate of the prisoner. It is not enough, therefore, in my opinion, that such evidence formed a part of the death-bed declaration. If a fact derived at second hand from the deceased, and stated too by him from memory, is a material element of any of the medical opinions on the trial, it is of much importance that the information be procured by a medical man; and that the person who procured it, whether professional or not, was aware at the time of the probability of its becoming important. Such evidence, although not collected with these precautions, is admissible; but I have so often had occasion to witness the carelessness with which the previous history of cases is inquired into both in medical and medico-legal practice, that I do not see how it is possible to put trust in evidence of the kind, unless it bear marks of having been collected with care, and under an impression of its probable consequence. These statements are well illustrated by the following example:—On the trial of Mrs. Smith for poisoning her maid-servant with arsenic, it was proved that some drug was administered by the prisoner in a suspicious manner on a Tuesday evening. Now it appeared at the trial improbable that this drug contained a fatal dose of arsenic, because to her fellow-servants, of whom one slept with her, and others frequently visited her, the deceased did not appear to be ill at all for eight hours after, or seriously ill for nearly a day. On the contrary, however, a surgeon, who was called to see her on the following Saturday, a few hours before her death, deposed that, according to information communicated by herself,