But, my Lords, the decree here is a foreign decree, and in judging of it we must consider the law of the country where it was pronounced, and from the authorities, my Lords, which have been quoted, it appears that a pardon in England does take off the whole consequence of the sentence. And in my opinion it would be highly unjust that the English sentence should be allowed to militate against a person exactly as it would do in England and not at the same time to give the pardon the same effect which it would have in that country. The _comitas_ due to the sentence of an English Court is also due to the pardon, or to the sentence which an English Court would pronounce in consequence of that pardon. I cannot figure a more grievous punishment than that of being held out as a person incapable of giving testimony in any cause; and if by the law of England all the consequences of a sentence are done away by His Majesty’s pardon, then this goes among the rest. Had the crime been committed, or the sentence pronounced, in Scotland I would have had another opinion. I do not sit here, my Lords, to pass judgment upon authors long since dead. But the same opinion is delivered by Dirleton, which is given by Sir George Mackenzie; and _his_ authority will not, I suppose, be questioned by any lawyer. And I hold it to be the law of Scotland, that a pardon does not restore the person pardoned, so as to free him from the infamy attending his crime. But as the law of England--the law of that country where the crime was committed, and the sentence pronounced--says otherwise, I am bound to repel the objection. Lord STONEFIELD--My Lords, I am for repelling the objection. It was repelled in the case of Lord Castlehaven in the State trials. [Illustration: Lord Stonefield. (_After Kay._)] Lord SWINTON--My Lords, this is a question of so much delicacy and importance that I could have wished more time to have weighed what I have heard from the counsel than the forms of Court will admit of. The question is--Whether His Majesty’s pardon did so far restore John Brown to the character and reputation he held before his conviction as to make his evidence admissible in the present trial? In substance, my opinion concurs with that of my brethren, for repelling, in the circumstances of the present case, the objection to the admissibility of the witness, leaving his credit to the consciences and good sense of the jury.