Trial of Pedro de Zulueta, jun., on a Charge of Slave Trading, under 5 Geo. IV, cap. 113, on Friday the 27th, Saturday the 28th, and Monday the 30th of October, 1843, at the Central Criminal Court, Old Bailey, London: A Full Report from the Short-hand Notes of W. B. Gurney, Esq.Zulueta, Pedro de
History
Trial of Pedro de Zulueta, jun., on a Charge of Slave Trading, under 5 Geo. IV, cap. 113, on Friday the 27th, Saturday the 28th, and Monday the 30th of October, 1843, at the Central Criminal Court, Old Bailey, London: A Full Report from the Short-hand Notes of W. B. Gurney, Esq.
Zulueta, Pedro de
Slave trade -- Africa; Slave traders -- Africa; Trial transcripts -- England -- London; Zulueta, Pedro de -- Trials, litigation, etc.
For the purpose not certainly of clearing up the question, but of
sophisticating a very plain case, it will perhaps be asked, whether, if
a man should avow himself before a Committee of the House of Commons to
have been guilty of a crime, or to have partaken in it, is it meant to
be contended that his candour is to be the safeguard of his guilt? One
short answer is, that the remark is inapplicable to the case; for no
such avowal has been even contended to have been made, but on the
contrary a distinct and repeated general and circumstantial disavowal
was made. Whether my declarations did or did not amount to such degree
of information in my mind, at the time of giving my evidence, as
presumed a knowledge two years before, that would be brought under the
description of the _guilty knowledge_ described in legal phraseology, in
an Act of Parliament, very obscure as is generally admitted, and never
before put in practice, this was the utmost that the ingenuity of the
prosecution could make out of my evidence--and this cannot be called an
avowal of crime. The question is not, whether a crime avowed before a
Committee of the House of Commons should or should not be prosecuted,
using the avowal as one of the means of conviction--a question, which
even so put is argued, I believe, on both sides by eminent lawyers--but
whether in my case, such as it is, I have not a right to complain of the
grossest and most unparalleled breach of good faith--whether the use
made of my evidence is not one against which the conscience of every man
revolts--whether it is likely to facilitate the public service, or to
increase the respect due to the British Legislature at home and abroad,
or to their proceedings--even if in other respects the course adopted is
free from legal objections, which I believe is at least doubtful.
The fact itself is unquestionable, and I must repeatedly assert it--that
the materials for my prosecution were collected from my own evidence as
laid before the public, in the printed Report of the Committee, for
whose information it was given--that in collecting these materials the
statements, although formally read as they were made, were virtually
vitiated--that, although the whole was read, only that part which was
thought susceptible of some adverse construction was avowed to be of any
necessary weight; and statements, such as they were, which had been
_made in 1842_, after information that was at any rate only furnished in
that year, were applied for the purpose of raising _a presumption of
guilty knowledge in 1840_.
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