tons, according to his official dispatch to the Governor of Sierra Leone, dated 12th December, 1840[2], as having been landed at Gallinas, without being able to say that the object was slave trading)--“a slave-mart and nothing but a slave-mart--you have a case, though it is an answerable case; but if the answer, which if it exist could be easily given, is not given, it may very fairly be inferred that the vessel was proceeding on a slaving voyage, a voyage either for the purpose of bringing home slaves, or of landing those goods for the purchase of slaves.” [2] Vide “Report. West Coast of Africa. Part II, Appendix,” &c. p. 460. The learned Judge is still upon the point of the nature of the adventure, as indicated by the nature of the trade said to prevail at Gallinas; and as in the former observations, since the name of Gallinas has been laid down as probably conveying no information to any but slave dealers and the slave police, the prisoner seems to remain untouched. But then it is laid down that an answer, which of course somewhere must exist, could be easily given by the accused. How so? but that the law, this special Act of Parliament, must be so understood as to require the simple shipping-agent in England to prepare himself with a full knowledge of the plans and the objects of the foreign merchant abroad, who orders certain goods to be purchased and shipped for his account. The learned Judge has not lost sight that in the universal practice of law, a conviction is only justifiable by evidence produced--that is, produced against, not by that which the accused party does not produce: but he feels it his duty, under the Act of Parliament he was expounding, to warn the Jury that the case is not so to be treated; for the operation of that Act, when to be applied to a commission-agent in this country, shipping goods to a place about which such evidence is offered as that it is a slave-mart, and a slave-mart only, even although the knowledge of that fact has been previously stated to be most probably confined to dealers in slaves, and the police employed against them, upon whose testimony alone it stood before the Court--in such a case, when dealing with the 5th Geo. IV, the _onus probandi_ lies with the accused. In the course of mercantile transactions, the commission-agent, who buys and ships goods by order and for account of a foreign merchant residing abroad, and to a port with which the former has no intercourse of trade whatever, would not be supposed nor could be expected to possess any further knowledge than that necessary to complete, in England, his own part of the transaction; but not so for the purposes of the Act in question. The reasoning seems to be this: here is a law which makes a certain knowledge guilty, if the object of the party abroad, originating the transaction be in deed and in fact a guilty one. In order to give force and strength to the operation of this law, it must