Now, let me consider the ninth section of the statute. I will readily concede to my learned friends whatever advantage they can gain from the proposition that, when the ninth section was drawn, in the year 1790, one year after the adoption of the Constitution, it was never supposed that a pretended commission or authority to prey upon the commerce of the United States and violate its laws would come from any part of the people or of the territory of the United States. And I claim that there is nothing in this commission which, if there had been no statute recognizing a possible protection from a commission--there is nothing in this commission from a citizen of the United States, Jefferson Davis, to another citizen of the United States, Thomas Harrison Baker, to prey upon the commerce of the United States, that can be regarded for a moment as a license which makes him a privateer, instead of a pirate. My learned friends have even sought to find occasion for a variance between the proof and the indictment because we have alleged, under the ninth section, that the pretended authority comes from "one Jefferson Davis," and have proved a commission which says, "I, Jefferson Davis, in the name of the Confederate States," have given such authority. Why, if your honors please, this indictment was drawn by an officer of the United States Government, to be tried in a Court of the United States; and, having a fear of the law and a sense of his duty to his country, he describes things as they are. And I would like to have my learned friends point out to me any place, any office, any title, any description, any addition, any qualification, that, under the laws of the United States of America and its Constitution, describes Jefferson Davis, except "one Jefferson Davis." He has precisely that port and dignity before the law and the Constitution that every other individual in the United States has, not filling an office and post of authority under our Government and under our laws. He does fill the place of citizen of the United States, and no measures of separate State action, or of Confederate authority, have relieved him from that full and complete description of him, under the Constitution of the United States, as the measure of his allegiance and of the penalties for its forfeiture. How could we have found a legal phrase or term, if we regard the Government of the United States and its Constitution, by which we could designate any such thing as "Confederate States," or a foreign state, within the accredited territory of the United States? The terms and intent of this ninth section were framed so as to cover every imaginable authority, in the nature of a commission from a State, from a nation, from a power, or from any person, under the law of nations, for the conversion of private marauders into public enemies with the rights of war; and, although it never entered into the imagination of the framers of this