statute that it would ever have to be applied to exclude protection under a commission from a citizen of the United States, its terms are absolutely fitting. I contend that the statute is complete, and that this commission is not a pretence of authority, even under the law of nations establishing and recognizing privateers for struggling communities. It is nothing but an authority from one citizen of the United States to another citizen of the United States to prey upon the property of the United States. There are, if the Court please, some political considerations which were, it appears to me, more appropriately urged by my learned friend, Mr. Larocque, in his first address to the Jury, than in his argument to the Court. The point made by him was this--that, under the Constitution of the United States, every citizen of every State held what was called the position of divided allegiance, having two sovereign masters over him; that they were equal and co-ordinate sovereigns; and that it was his duty to obey both of them. Now, with the necessary limitation that each one is sovereign over him in some respects, and has not the least power over him in others, and that the other is sovereign over him in other respects, and does not include the first topic or line of duty, there is a speculative support for this general notion. And, whenever it is not urged into any absurd consequences, it serves, in the language of the Courts and of public men, to describe the complex Government under which we live. But, if my learned friend means to assert that there are, under the Government of the United States, according to its form and method of organic operation, two equal sovereigns over every citizen on the same subjects, why then he has flown in the face of a fundamental proposition, coming from higher authority than the Convention of 1790--that no man can serve two masters. It is not in the nature of things that there can be two sovereigns having equal rights and authority over one subject; and my learned friend illustrates the absurdity of the proposition when he comes to consider what would be the result if the two sovereigns should disagree. He says it is the duty of the subject to adhere to one side or the other; that, it being his complete duty to adhere to one side, the other side cannot complain of it as a breach of duty that he does not adhere to him, but to the other; and that, therefore, the general rule, that when you have a sovereign and are unfaithful to him you may be hanged, cannot apply to the case, because you would, in either case, be hanged. And his wise, and suitable, and certainly humane solution of this difficulty is, that when one of the sovereigns indicts you for treason, it is a good bar to say you elected in good faith to serve the other sovereign. Thus, so far from there being two sovereigns, the nature of the term sovereign including the right to hang you for unfaithfulness, there is not one that has the right to hang you, and