_A._ In answer to that I would say that this is what troubles me: I want to do my duty; I want to render a verdict fairly and squarely as between the prisoner and the people; but I have this to contend with--I have read that people have been convicted upon the clearest testimony, and afterwards found to be innocent; and before I would have such feelings I would as soon go to the scaffold as send a person there who was not guilty. Therefore my sympathy is so strong that I am afraid to trust myself. I did serve on a former occasion, and I do not know that even then I did my duty. _Q._ What do you mean by being afraid to trust yourself? Is it a conscientious feeling and opinion against the penalty of capital punishment? _A._ Yes, sir, it is. I have a great abhorrence of it, if I may so express myself. Yet I should like to render a verdict, and do what is right; but I believe my feelings are too great to trust myself. _The Court_: We think we are bound to set the juror aside. _Mr. Larocque_: Permit me to put one question. _Q._ It strikes me that you are a little at fault as to what the purport of this question is. It is not whether you have an abhorrence of convicting a prisoner of a capital offence. The question is, whether you have such conscientious scruples against capital punishment as would prevent your finding the prisoner guilty, if the facts were proved, and the Court instructed you that those facts constituted the offence? _A._ I answered before. It places me in rather a peculiar position. As I said, I want it understood distinctly, I desire to do my duty; but there is a struggle between that and my sympathy, and I am afraid to trust myself. _Q._ But you can draw a distinction between your sympathy and any conscientious scruples against the punishment of death, can you not? _A._ Well, sir, where it comes to the point---- _Q._ Allow me to put the question in another way: If you are entirely satisfied, upon the evidence and instructions of the Court, that the prisoner was guilty, your conscience would not trouble you in finding him guilty? _A._ Well, sir, there would be this: I would feel that persons, under the strongest kind of testimony, have been found guilty, wrongfully, and it would operate on me--the fear that I had judged wrong on the facts, and committed murder. That feeling is very strong. _Q._ If the evidence satisfied you that the prisoner was guilty, would your conscience prevent your saying so? _A._ It would not now. It might in the jury-room. When it comes to the point, and I feel that I hold the life of a human being, it is pretty hard to know what I would do then. _Q._ Your conscience would only trouble you if you doubted that your judgment was right? _A._ Yes, sir. _Mr. Larocque_: I submit that the juror is competent. _Juror_: You must take your chances if you take me. I still think I am not fit to sit on a jury to represent the people.