Count I of the indictment, in addition to the separate charge of conspiracy, also alleges unlawful participation in the formulation and execution of plans to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity which actually involved the commission of such crimes. We, therefore, cannot properly strike the whole of Count I from the indictment, but insofar as Count I charges the commission of the alleged crime of conspiracy as a separate substantive offense, distinct from any war crime or crime against humanity, the Tribunal will disregard that charge. This ruling must not be construed as limiting the force or effect of Article 2, paragraph 2 of Control Council Law No. 10, or as denying to either prosecution or defense the right to offer in evidence any facts or circumstances, occurring either before or after September 1939, if such facts or circumstances tend to prove or to disprove the commission by any defendant of war crimes or crimes against humanity as defined in Control Council Law No. 10. ----- [30] Tr. pp. 10717-10718, 14 July 47. X. FINAL PLEA FOR DEFENDANT KARL BRANDT[31] BY DR. SERVATIUS Mr. President, your Honors: I cannot comment on all the questions which the prosecution brought up this morning. I must limit myself to a few things and can refer to my closing brief where I have gone into considerable detail on all these questions. This morning I heard the detailed legal arguments advanced by the prosecutor. I have commented particularly on these legal questions in my closing brief, and I will now merely make a few brief comments. The prosecution assumes that Law No. 10 is an independent law. This is not correct, for it designates itself explicitly as a law for the execution of the London Charter and declares that Charter to be an integral part of the law. Now, the sole purpose of the London Charter is to punish disturbances of international legal relations, and not what has happened or is happening somewhere within an individual state. Any other interpretation would put an end to the conception of sovereignty, and it would give right of intervention into the affairs of other states. In the trial before Tribunal III, Case No. 3, against Flick et al.,[32] General Taylor referred to an alleged right of intervention, quoting a considerable amount of literature with regard to this right of intervention into the internal affairs of another country. I have ventured to refer to the position taken concerning this by one of the four signatory powers of the London Charter, a signatory power which was itself the victim of intervention in the name of civilization, the Soviet Union. I have attached the said literature to part I of my closing brief.