Let us examine the conclusions to be drawn from this legal situation in our case: Agreement and so-called likely agreement, just as well as a national emergency and a war emergency, constitute special legal justifications, the recognition of which allows us to dispense with a recourse to the general principle of evaluating conflicting rights and interests. The latter retains its subsidiary importance. Furthermore, those two special legal justifications refer in their purport to a fair and equitable way of thinking as well as to the proportional importance of various types of evils; thus they themselves include the conception of evaluating conflicting rights and values. For this reason, among others, the following must be explained in detail at this point: A national emergency and a war emergency were unmistakably in existence in 1942. Every day the lives of thousands of wounded were endangered unless the threatening wound infection could be checked by the application of proper remedies and the elimination of inadequate remedies. The danger was “actual”. Immediate help had to be provided. The “public interest” demanded the experimental clarification of this question. The evidence has shown that the question could not be clarified by experiments on animals or by the observation of incidental wounds. The last word on this question, however, is not said merely by reference to the public interest. Opposed to the public interest are the individual interests. The saying “necessity knows no law” cannot claim unlimited validity. But just as little can the infringement on individual interests in order to save others be considered as “contrary to good morals”. The evidence has shown that the members of the resistance movement of Camp Ravensbrueck who were condemned to death could only escape imminent execution if they submitted to the experiments which form the subject of this indictment. There is no need to examine here and now whether the experimental subjects did give their consent or whether they presumably would have consented, if, from their personal point of view and in the full knowledge of the situation, they could have made a decision within the meaning of an objective judicial opinion based on probability. What really matters is the question of whether after a just and fair evaluation of the interests of the general public and the real interests of the experimental subjects, the defendant could conclude that, all circumstances considered, the execution of the experiments was justifiable. Without doubt this question can be answered in the affirmative. Quite apart from the interest of the state in the execution of the experiments, participation in the experiments was in the real and well-considered interest of the experimental subjects themselves, since this participation offered the only possibility of saving their lives through an act of mercy. * * * * *