Shortly after the commencement of operations for the disposal of “incurables”, the program was extended to Jews, and then to concentration camp inmates. In this latter phase of the program, prisoners deemed by the examining doctors to be unfit or useless for labor were ruthlessly weeded out and sent to the extermination stations in great numbers. Karl Brandt maintains that he is not implicated in the extermination of Jews or of concentration camp inmates; that his official responsibility for euthanasia ceased at the close of the summer of 1941, at which time euthanasia procedures against “incurables” were terminated by order of Hitler. It is difficult to believe this assertion, but even if it be true, we cannot understand how this fact would aid the defendant. The evidence is conclusive that almost at the outset of the program non-German nationals were selected for euthanasia and exterminated. Needless to say, these persons did not voluntarily consent to become the subjects of this procedure. Karl Brandt admits that after he had disposed of the medical decisions required to be made by him with regard to the initial program which he maintains was valid, he did not follow the program further but left the administrative details of execution to Bouhler. If this be true, his failure to follow up a program for which he was charged with special responsibility constituted the gravest breach of duty. A discharge of that duty would have easily revealed what now is so manifestly evident from the record; that whatever may have been the original aim of the program, its purposes were prostituted by men for whom Brandt was responsible, and great numbers of non-German nationals were exterminated under its authority. We have no doubt but that Karl Brandt—as he himself testified—is a sincere believer in the administration of euthanasia to persons hopelessly ill, whose lives are burdensome to themselves and an expense to the state or to their families. The abstract proposition of whether or not euthanasia is justified in certain cases of the class referred to is no concern of this Tribunal. Whether or not a state may validly enact legislation which imposes euthanasia upon certain classes of its citizens is likewise a question which does not enter into the issues. Assuming that it may do so, the Family of Nations is not obligated to give recognition to such legislation when it manifestly gives legality to plain murder and torture of defenseless and powerless human beings of other nations. The evidence is conclusive that persons were included in the program who were non-German nationals. The dereliction of the defendant Brandt contributed to their extermination. That is enough to require this Tribunal to find that he is criminally responsible in the program.