If there was a preponderance of opinion in Germany favorable to the
Bagdad Railway, there was by no means a similar favorable sentiment in
the rest of Europe. Statesmen in the other imperial nations were not
unaware of the potentialities of railways constructed in the backward
nations of the world. They knew that “railways are the iron tentacles
of latter-day expanding powers. They are stretched out caressingly at
first. But once the iron has, so to say, entered the soul of the weaker
nation, the tentacles swell to the dimensions of brawny arms, and the
embrace tightens to a crushing grip.”[40] Russia, Great Britain and
France, therefore, were gradually led to obstruct the progress of the
railway by political and economic means—at least until such time as
they could purge the project of its political possibilities or until
they could obtain for themselves a larger share of the spoils.
Thus the Bagdad Railway was an imperial enterprise. It became an
important concern of the Foreign Office, a matter of national
prestige. It was one of the stakes of pre-war diplomacy. Its success
was associated with the national honor, to be defended, if need be,
by military force and military alliances. The Railway was no longer a
railway alone, but a state of mind. Professor Jastrow called it “the
spectre of the twentieth century”![41]
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL AND EXPLANATORY NOTES
[1] _Die Bagdadbahn_, p. 46.
[2] _Stenographische Berichte, XII Legislaturperiode, 1 Session_,
Volume 231 (1908), pp. 4226a, 4253c.
[3] Wile, _op. cit._, pp. 39–40.
[4] Riesser, _op. cit._, p. 543; _The Quarterly Review_, Volume 235
(1921), p. 315.
[5] _Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords_, Volume 121 (1903), p. 1348.
[6] For an interesting discussion of this point see George von Siemens,
“The National Importance of the Bourse,” in _The Nation_ (London),
October 6, 1900. _Cf._, also, W. M. Shuster, _The Strangling of Persia:
a Record of European Diplomacy_ and _Oriental Intrigue_ (New York,
1912).
[7] W. M. Sombart, _Die deutsche Volkswirtschaft in neunzehnten
Jahrhundert_ (second edition, Berlin, 1909), p. 184.
[8] Regarding early German interest in Near Eastern colonization _cf._
K. A. Sprenger, _Babylonien, das reichste Land in der Vorzeit und das
lohnendste Kolonisationsfeld für die Gegenwart_ (Heidelberg, 1886);
Paul Dehn, _Deutschland und die Orientbahnen_ (Munich, 1883); K.
Karger, _Kleinasien, ein deutsches Kolonisationsfeld_ (Berlin, 1892);
_Deutsche Ansprüche an das türkischen Erbe_ (Munich, 1896), a symposium
including an article by von Moltke.
[9] C. Nawratski, _Die jüdische Kolonisation Palästinas_ (Munich,
1914); _Syria and Palestine_, p. 59; _Mesopotamia_, pp. 6–7, 11;
_Anatolia_, pp. 4–7.
[10] _Supra_, p. 84; H. F. B. Lynch, “The Bagdad Railway,” in
the _Fortnightly Review_, March 1, 1911, pp. 376–377; A. Brisse,
“Les intérêts de l’Allemagne dans l’Empire Ottoman,” in _Revue de
Géographie_, June, 1902, pp. 486–487; P. Rohrbach, _Die Bagdadbahn_,
pp. 17–21, 35.
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