Persistent rumors in the London press that a Bagdad Railway agreement had been negotiated brought the subject to the attention of the Cabinet, which heretofore, apparently, had not been consulted by the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. It was decided that the Prime Minister should make a statement to Parliament—a statement which, perhaps, might serve as a sort of trial balloon to ascertain the opinion of the country upon the question. Mr. Balfour’s presentation of the Bagdad Railway affair to the House of Commons, as we have seen, however, provoked unfriendly comments from the floor and was subjected to heavy fire from the press. Thereupon a rebellious element in the Cabinet—led, presumably, by Joseph Chamberlain, who now was more interested in the development of the economic resources of the British Empire under a system of protective and preferential tariffs, than in coöperation with other nations—persuaded Mr. Balfour not to risk the life of his Ministry on the question of British participation in the Bagdad enterprise. Accordingly, the agreement with the _Deutsche Bank_ was repudiated, and on April 23, 1903, Mr. Balfour informed the House of Commons that His Majesty’s Government was determined to withdraw all support, financial and otherwise, which Great Britain might be in a position to lend the Bagdad Railway. He was convinced, he said, after a careful examination of the proposals of the German promoters, that no agreement was possible which would compensate the Empire for its diplomatic assistance and guarantee security for British interests.[10] This announcement was a distinct disappointment to the bankers in Berlin and in London. The directors of the _Deutsche Bank_ were stunned by the termination of negotiations which they believed had been progressing satisfactorily. The British financiers were chagrined at the sudden decision of their Government to oppose their participation in a promising enterprise. They were convinced that the terms offered by the German bankers met every condition imposed by the Prime Minister. They were agreed on the wisdom of British coöperation with the _Deutsche Bank_, and they were not a little annoyed at what appeared to be bad faith on the part of Downing Street. They were convinced that only a bellicose press frustrated the attempt to make the Bagdad Railway an international highway.[11]