As events turned out, the failure of the Balfour Government to
effect the internationalization of the Bagdad Railway was a colossal
diplomatic blunder. If the proposed agreement of 1903 had been
consummated, the _entente_ of 1904 between France and England would
have taken control of the enterprise out of the hands of the Germans,
who would have possessed, with their Turkish collaborators, only
fourteen of the thirty votes in the Board of Directors. Sir Henry
Babington Smith assures the author that there was nothing in the
arrangement suggested by the _Deutsche Bank_ which would have prevented
eventual Franco-British domination of the line. Surely, as Bismarck is
said to have remarked, every nation must pay sooner or later for the
windows broken by its bellicose press!
VESTED INTERESTS COME TO THE FORE
In addition to the pressure which was brought to bear on the Balfour
Cabinet by the newspapers, there were important vested business
interests which quietly, but effectively, made themselves heard at
Downing Street during the critical days of the Bagdad negotiations of
1903.
It already has been noted that in 1888, as part of the plans of the
Public Debt Administration for the improvement of transportation
facilities in Turkey, the British-owned Smyrna-Aidin Railway Company
was granted permission to construct several important branches to
its main line. For a time this new concession thoroughly satisfied
the owners and directors of the Company, and there was no objection
on their part to the extension and development of the German-owned
Anatolian system. By 1903, however, when the Bagdad concession was
under discussion, the Smyrna-Aidin line demanded the protection of the
British Government against the undue extension of German railways in
the Near East. In particular, it objected to the agreement between the
Anatolian Railway and the Smyrna-Cassaba Railway, by which the latter
joined its tracks with the Anatolian system at Afiun Karahissar and
accepted a schedule of tariffs satisfactory to both lines.[13] The
Smyrna-Aidin Company feared that the Bagdad Railway would develop the
ports of Haidar Pasha, Alexandretta, and Mersina at the expense of
the prosperity of Smyrna, thereby decreasing the relative importance
of the Smyrna-Aidin line and cutting down the volume of its traffic.
Finally, it objected to the payment of a kilometric guarantee to the
German concessionaires while there was no likelihood of its being
similarly favored by the custodians of the public purse. The interests
of the shareholders of the railway were well represented in the House
of Commons by “that watchful dragon of imperial interests”, Mr. Gibson
Bowles.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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