The outbreak of the Great War precipitated a serious political crisis at Constantinople. Decisions of the utmost moment to the future of the Ottoman Empire had to be taken. Chief among these was the choice between neutrality and entry into the war in coöperation with the Central Powers. Pacifists and Entente sympathizers, of whom Djavid Bey was perhaps the foremost, counseled non-intervention in the struggle. Militarists and Germanophiles, headed by Enver Pasha, the distinguished Minister of War, advocated early and complete observance of the alliance with Germany, which called for active military measures against the Entente. In support of the pacifists were the great mass of the people, overburdened with taxes, worn out with military service, and weary of the sacrifices occasioned by the Tripolitan and Balkan Wars. In support of the militarists were German economic power, German military prestige, and the powerful emotion of Turkish nationalism. The case of the pacifists, like that of their opponents, was based frankly upon national self-interest. A great European war seemed to them to offer an unprecedented opportunity for setting Ottoman affairs in order without the perennial menace of foreign interference. Ottoman neutrality would be solicited by some of the belligerents, Ottoman intervention by others; during the war, however, no nation could afford to bully Turkey. By clever diplomatic bargaining economic and political privileges of the greatest importance might be obtained—the Capitulations, for example, might be abolished. Neutral Turkey might grow prosperous by a thriving commerce with the belligerents. After the peace both victor and vanquished would be too exhausted to think of aggression against a revivified Ottoman Empire. To remain neutral was to assure peace, security, and prosperity. To intervene was to invite defeat and dismemberment.